WaPo: Volokh: Waiting for the dogs during police traffic stops by Orin Kerr:

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66 year old prison inmate in poor health and held in isolation for 41 years stated grounds for preliminary injunction against six strip searches a day when he is removed from his cell in shackles. The chances of his being a drug mule are “minuscule.” Wilkerson v. Stalder, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12185 (M.D. La. January 31, 2014):

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Officer serving a civil protective order violated curtilage by going to the back door and finding a marijuana grow. Jadrich v. State, 999 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind. App. 2013):

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The stop of the car defendant was a passenger in was without sufficient cause. It was not attenuated by the fact defendant was found to be on probation with a search condition. People v. Bates, 222 Cal. App. 4th 60, 165 Cal. Rptr. 3d 573 (6th Dist. 2013). California official summary:

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Officers received a call that two men were showing each other handguns in a convenience store. When he got there, he could see one who worked there with a gun in his waistband. He took him outside for a frisk. It turned out the gun was stolen, and he was a felon in possession. The frisk was valid, and the New Mexico courts have held that possession of a loaded gun is at least reasonable suspicion. It is a concealed carry state, but the exceptions need not be negated before the frisk. United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481 (10th Cir. 2013):

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Defendant was a Tulsa police officer caught in an FBI sting suspecting him and others of stealing from drug dealers. The FBI rented a motel room and wired it for video and sound, and the FBI agent in the room as known as “Joker.” Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversations in the room that would make a Title III warrant necessary. United States v. Wells, 739 F.3d 511 (10th Cir. 2014):

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Defendant was investigated after the disappearance of a 16 year old girl in California. Once into her email account, sexually explicit emails with defendant from New Mexico were found. Police came to his house and saw her braless through the front window, and defendant taking pictures of her. They entered and arrested, and he was indicted for interstate transportation for sex with a minor. The inevitable discovery doctrine supported the entry because they clearly had probable cause. They entered because they feared for her safety [why not exigent circumstances? Feared it wasn’t good enough?]. If a warrant had been sought, it would have been granted. There’s no requirement that the police actually be in the process of getting the warrant to enter under this rule. United States v. Christy, 739 F.3d 534 (10th Cir. 2014):

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Being in possession of and driving a car is indicative of standing, but it only a factor. More is required. The trial court’s conclusion on the probable cause question is a mixed question of law and fact, and the appellate court disagrees here that there was probable cause for a search of defendant’s car. The police had reasonable suspicion but not probable cause. Therefore, the motion to suppress should have been granted. Commonwealth v. Newman, 2014 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2 (January 6, 2014).*

Officers had reason to stop defendant for taillights and no LPN. He consented to a search of his person and a contact lens case which had methamphetamine in it. United States v. Stringer, 739 F.3d 391 (8th Cir. 2014).*

Defendant was charged with contempt and witness tampering. There was probable cause and nexus to his house for a search warrant. United States v. Walker, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182429 (D. Minn. December 4, 2013),* adopted 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 692 (D. Minn. January 3, 2014).*

NYLJ: NYC, Plaintiffs Reach Accord in Stop-and-Frisk by Mark Hamblett:

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Defendant’s furtive movement stuffing something under seat justified a frisk of the vehicle under Michigan v. Long, particularly after defendant was found to be on parole for firearms offenses. [Also, the license plate didn’t belong to the car; what about impoundment and inventory as an alternative, which was not mentioned?] United States v. Marquez, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11231 (D. Kan. January 30, 2014).*

Plaintiff’s illegal search and detention claims were time barred when the suit was brought. Glaser v. City and County of Denver, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 1776 (10th Cir. January 29, 2014).*

Defendant’s DWI blood draw was valid either on exigent circumstances or his being on probation. State v. Maschke, 2014-Ohio-288, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 277 (5th Dist. January 27, 2014).*

Police arrest of a confederate during a long surveillance of house was exigency [but not police created] for a warrantless entry into the house until they could get a search warrant. The confederate made a call, and defendant was on the phone. It was reasonable to conclude it was a warning. United States v. Lockett, 533 Fed. Appx. 957 (11th Cir. 2013).

The second search of defendant’s property two months after he was in custody was with consent of the co-tenant. United States v. Denton, 535 Fed. Appx. 832 (11th Cir. 2013).*

When defendant is a known meth manufacturer, possession of peroxide in the car is incriminating and in plain view. State v. Binkley, 2013 Ohio 3695, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 3817 (5th Dist. August 26, 2013).*

Defendant was confronted by the police walking in a park with a companion. As the officer got close, he handed the sweatshirt in his hand to his companion and the officer grabbed it. Defendant’s hand was still on it, so that was not an abandonment, and he still had control over it. The seizure was invalid. B.L. v. State, 127 So. 3d 552 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).*

Officers had information from a good source that defendant was at a particular address, and they had an arrest warrant. They knocked at the door, and nobody answered. They went to the back and found a man who said that Stoekel was the tenant. They went back to the front door, and Stoekel finally answered the door. He would not consent to an entry to search for defendant but he let the officers into the living room. Once in the living room, a discussion of the crime of harboring got Stoekel to point upstairs. That was consent to go upstairs, and defendant was found asleep with a gun next to him. That was valid consent. United States v. Collins, 699 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2012).*

Defendant “indicated” during his valid stop that he was attempting to flee, and that supported an arrest and search incident. State v. Durham, 107 So. 3d 755 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2012).*

Defendant allegedly raped a woman and stole her purse and her cell phone. The police tracked the phone to where he was staying, but they milled around outside for hours, and then they decided to do a knock-and-talk at 5 am because they declined to get a search warrant, not wanting to compromise the technology used to track the phone. Defendant’s girlfriend refused admittance, and said to come back with a warrant. When she attempted to shut the door, the first officer blocked the door shutting with his foot and then they pushed their way in. The entry violated the Fourth Amendment. Thomas v. State, 127 So. 3d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013):

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Officers with a search warrant for a house could search any car on the premises. One was a car with out-of-state plates with defendant sitting in the driveway. State v. Williams, 125 So. 3d 1195 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2013).

Defendant’s parking his car in front of a business driveway was reason for the officer to stop and inquire. Defendant was found DUI. State v. Weese, 2013 Ohio 4056, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 4215 (10th Dist. September 19, 2013).*

In a post-conviction hearing for failure to pursue a motion to suppress because defendant was an overnight guest, the hearing court’s finding that defendant was not a guest was supported by the evidence, and defense counsel was thus not ineffective. Majors v. State, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 794 (September 18, 2013).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not arguing that South Carolina law would have prohibited his recorded jail call there from coming into evidence. He did argue Florida law on that issue, which if anything, is more protective of rights, applied, and the defense lost on that issue. There’s no reason to believe South Carolina law would be any better. Jackson v. State, 127 So. 3d 447 (Fla. 2013).*

Officers were on the lookout for a serial rapist who struck homes in wooded areas on rainy nights. On this rainy night, in a wooded neighborhood, the police encountered defendant on a report of somebody peeping in cars. Defendant was driving a Jeep that the officer had seen parked in the area an hour earlier with a warm hood. The officer got his name and license number but let him go. Later, defendant was identified as a suspect. The stop was with reasonable suspicion some crime was afoot when defendant was stopped. State v. Burdick, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 494 (June 11, 2013).* (Another of defendant’s cases from June 13, 2012 in a different county is here.)

The officer stopped defendant for a traffic violation and recognized him from having stopped him before and finding a gun. Defendant was looking straight ahead, wouldn’t make eye contact, was sweating and breathing heavy, and was rubbing his hands on his thighs. The officer was concerned he was armed and got him out of the car for a patdown, which defendant ducked and tried to avoid. There was a take down and a gun slid out. This was all reasonable. United States v. Bong, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82438 (D. Kan. June 12, 2013).*

Court grants the government a hearing to overcome the USMJ’s recommendation a Franks motion to suppress be granted so the record can be supplemented. United States v. Guzman-Batista, 948 F. Supp. 2d 194 (D. P.R. 2013).*

Even though the state trooper’s primary purpose was interdiction, there was a factual basis for stopping defendant for not having headlights on during a period of rain. Defendant’s backing out of the car and the way he held his body suggested he was armed, and that justified a patdown. United States v. Patterson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11014 (D. Conn. January 29, 2014).*

There was reasonable suspicion for detaining defendant who was walking away from the scene of a recent robbery, and he matched the description. The stop didn’t ripen into an arrest until later. United States v. Young, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10820 (D. Nev. January 17, 2014).*

Officers had multiple reports that a green Durango was involved in a shots fired incident, and that provided reason for its stop. United States v. Morris, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10567 (D. Minn. January 14, 2014).*

Consent to search a vehicle came from the driver, so the defendant passenger’s argument about inventory is moot. He also lacked standing as to anything except his own bag in the trunk, and, by the time the police found it, they had probable cause under the automobile exception. United States v. Blunt, 535 Fed. Appx. 542 (9th Cir. 2013).*

Citizen’s reports directly to officer of men with guns that included a description, color, and license number of the car was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Burton, 532 Fed. Appx. 171 (3d Cir. 2013).*

Defendant’s consent for the police to search and seize his cell phone was knowing and voluntary. They told him they’d hook it up to “a device” that would “analyze it.” United States v. Hutchinson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106443 (N.D. Ga. June 24, 2013),* adopted 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106054 (N.D. Ga. July 30, 2013).*

A 1983 case over the legality of plaintiff’s arrest does not implicate the validity of his conviction because an illegal arrest does not prevent a trial in Ohio [and almost everywhere else]. Therefore, the case is not barred by Heck v. Humphrey. Graves v. Mahoning County, 534 Fed. Appx. 399 (6th Cir. 2013)*:

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A pre-Jardines dog sniff of the front door of a house in Indiana, while now known to be a Fourth Amendment violation, wasn’t at the time it happened, so under Davis, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Cota, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120008 (S.D. Ind. August 23, 2013).

Officers observed defendant parked in the driveway of a house in a high-crime area known for drugs. They had followed him from a known drug house to that spot. They walked up to him and tapped on the window saying they wanted a word with him “real quick.” He rolled down the window, and they asked for his DL which they ran and found suspended. In the arrest for driving on a suspended license, the officer asked if defendant had anything “illegal” on him, and defendant said he had a gun, which they relieved him of. He was a felon. The stop was consensual. United States v. Hinojosa, 534 Fed. Appx. 468 (6th Cir. 2013).*

There was a dog sniff at the door, but there was otherwise probable cause, and the search is not suppressed. Therefore, Jardines is not implicated because it depends completely on the sniff. United States v. Nagy, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 9308 (5th Cir. May 7, 2013); United States v. Evans, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146330 (S.D. Tex. October 9, 2013). [Note: Nagy did not come in the daily download from Lexis back in May because the key words are not in the case.]

Plaintiff’s adult daughter with equal access consented to police entry; summary judgment affirmed. Barrera v. Kroskey, 535 Fed. Appx. 735 (10th Cir. 2013),*