Plaintiff’s suit against officer seizing money during traffic stop could proceed; ALJ ordered money returned, and the officer arranged for the IRS to seize it for a tax lien

Plaintiff was stopped in Tennessee for speeding. He was asked about whether he had various things in his car, including cash, and he said that he had “something over $9,000” to pay his employees. It was $9,400, and the officer found that was a discrepancy. A nearly same name came back on a criminal history check for importing marijuana 10 years earlier, but that person had a different FBI number, which would indicate it was a different person. The court held the video belied the officer’s claim that the plaintiff was nervous. Plaintiff claimed he did not use banks because he had a running IRS dispute which was being handled. There was a dog alert, but nothing was present [presumably the dog alerted on cash, and cases have held for 20 years that a dog alert on cash alone is meaningless; I just researched that issue in January when I sued an officer over a seizure after a dog alert produced no drugs]. After the seizure, the state ALJ ordered return of the money, but the officer told the IRS so they could seize it. The plaintiff stated a claim for unlawful seizure of the cash under the Fourth Amendment and conversion, and the officer’s claim of qualified immunity was denied. Ibarra v. Barrett, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29143 (April 19, 2007).

Extending a valid traffic stop was not an unreasonable detention because it was based on reasonable suspicion based on what the officer observed during the stop. United States v. Sanchez, 225 Fed. Appx. 288 (5th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished):

Sanchez’s arguments resemble those made in Brigham. There we rejected the notion that an officer’s questioning “on a subject unrelated to the purpose of a routine traffic stop” was itself a Fourth Amendment violation, and held that the officer did not act unreasonably in extending the stop. 382 F.3d at 508 (emphasis omitted); see also id. (“[D]etention, not questioning, is the evil at which Terry’s second prong is aimed.” (quoting United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1993))). The occupants of the vehicle in Brigham had aroused the officer’s suspicion because the lessee was not present and they had appeared nervous, avoided eye contact, and answered questions indirectly. Id.

Assuming Turk extended the detention, he had reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that Sanchez was involved in drug trafficking. Turk’s suspicions were aroused by the “roaring noise” emanating from the dashboard; Sanchez’s shaking hand and nervousness; the recently issued insurance certificate; the discrepancy between the addresses on Sanchez’s license and the insurance certificate; Sanchez’s averting his eyes when asked if he carried contraband; and the fact that Sanchez was driving a known drug-courier route.

Dog alert was not apparent to anybody but the handler, but the USMJ credited the handler’s testimony that there was an alert, and the videotape apparently confirmed it. United States v. Willis, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29077 (D. Neb. April 17, 2007).

As opposed to both Jacobs and Heir, Sergeant Van Buren testified that Rocky indicated to the presence of drug odor, n5 and Judge Thalken credited Sergeant Van Buren’s testimony in that regard. That Rocky is a fast dog and a passive indicator, and that Sergeant Van Buren did not let Rocky go into a full sit, does not render Rocky’s behavior ambiguous. An officer who is familiar with a dog’s tendencies can testify to the behaviors that dog would exhibit to indicate to the presence of drug odor. I have reviewed the tape and, crediting Sergeant Van Buren’s testimony concerning Rocky’s behavior, I find objectively observable evidence that Rocky indicated to the presence of drug odor. I concur with Judge Thalken’s findings, and accordingly I will adopt the Report and Recommendation in its entirety.