State JP issued warrant did not specify the crime under investigation, so the particularity clause of the warrant was fatally overbroad, quoting at length from United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1992). The good faith exception did not save the warrant, either. United States v. Smith, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96396 (W.D. N.Y. December 15, 2006):
The search warrant in this case, as previously stated, does not mention a particular crime or criminal activity to which the evidence to be seized must relate. As a result, it “is so unconstitutionally broad that no reasonably well-trained police officer could believe otherwise.” Id. at 77. Therefore, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to that search warrant be GRANTED.
Warrant for a particular address did not allow or justify search of defendant’s car when he was found driving on the street, even though the warrant permitted search of defendant’s vehicles without mentioning them being parked on the premises. State v. Southall, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 491 (June 25, 2007):
We agree with the trial court and the defendant that the search of the defendant’s vehicle was not authorized under the search warrant. Although the search warrant states that the place to be searched included any vehicles in the defendant’s possession or control, we conclude that this provision can only be read to include vehicles found on the property described in the search warrant at 481 Southport Road. A warrant authorizing the search of a building “presupposes that the building mentioned in the warrant to be searched would include outhouses, vehicles upon the premises, and other places, which are appurtenant to the described building and are under the control of persons named in the warrant.” Worden v. State, 197 Tenn. 340, 344, 273 S.W.2d 139, 141 (1954) (emphasis added). However, this authorization does not extend to vehicles that are not on the premises described in the search warrant. See Dolen v. State, 187 Tenn. 663, 667, 216 S.W.2d 351, 353 (1948). In Dolen, the defendant challenged the search of a vehicle that was on a road adjoining the property described by the search warrant. Our supreme court held that the vehicle search was invalid because “a warrant directing the search of a certain described parcel of real estate does not authorize the search of an automobile parked in front of that real estate, but outside its boundaries, on an adjoining road.” Id.
As the state points out, the search warrant in Dolen authorized, by its terms, a search of “all outbuildings or vehicles on the premises.” Id. at 664, 216 S.W.2d at 352 (emphasis added). In contrast, the warrant in the present case states that a search is to be conducted of all outbuildings and vehicles in the defendant’s “possession and or control.” However, the conclusion in Dolen was not premised on the language of the search warrant. Rather, the court relied on the statute providing that a search warrant must “‘particularly’ describe ‘the place to be searched,'” Id. at 668, 216 S.W.2d at 353, and on prior cases holding that a search warrant allowing the search of a building at described premises also authorizes the search of vehicles on that premises, Id. (citing Lawson v. State, 176 Tenn. 457, 143 S.W.2d 716 (1940); Seals v. State, 157 Tenn. 538, 11 S.W.2d 879 (1928)).
Search of a matchbox during a frisk could not be justified. Meth suppressed. State v. Kelley, 227 S.W.3d 543 (Mo. App. 2007).
Traffic stop with an objective basis can be pretextual. State v. Fry, 2007 Ohio 3240, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 2998 (9th Dist. June 27, 2007):
[*P13] Appellant has countered that the traffic stop was pretextual because Officer Rastorfer testified at the suppression hearing that he was not concerned about the turn signal and that he failed to issue a citation or a warning for the traffic violation. Even if Officer Rastorfer’s failure to cite or warn the cab driver indicates a pretextual reason for the traffic stop, Appellant’s argument still fails as a matter of law.
[*P14] Both the United States Supreme Court and the Ohio State Supreme Court have held that a police officer’s subjective intent when initiating a traffic stop has no bearing on the Fourth Amendment analysis if the officer stops the vehicle based on probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 819; Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d at syllabus. This is the case even if the traffic stop is pretextual. Id. Here, the record is clear that Officer Rastorfer had probable cause to pull Appellant’s cab over for a traffic violation: namely, the failure to properly use a turn signal. The initial traffic did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
