CA9: Plaintiff gets to go to jury on claim of excessive force in arrest for CC fraud with personal animus

Plaintiff was a yoga instructor who was dating a San Diego County Deputy Sheriff. They weren’t married, but they lived together, had children together, and their finances were completely intermingled, with her a stay-at-home mom. After the relationship soured and they split, defendant had her arrested for credit card fraud because she still had one. There was probable cause for her arrest and the search of her house and an ADA signed off on the search warrant. After the arrest, the DA refused to prosecute. There was enough probable cause to avoid liability for false arrest and the search warrant, even though plaintiff’s expert testified in a deposition that it was “neglect of duty” not to have interviewed her before the arrest, not after. Plaintiff gets to go to the jury, however, on her excessive force claim that deputies arrested her for credit card fraud at gunpoint and were as intimidating as possible with personal animus, when she had their children. Cameron v. Craig, 713 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2013)*:

Cameron also brings claims regarding the amount of force the County Defendants used to execute the search warrant and Cameron’s arrest. Cameron alleges that the County Defendants used “SWAT-like” tactics in order to intimidate her, and that a jury could find that the level of force employed was constitutionally excessive. The County Defendants asserted that the amount of force used was reasonable and that Craig is entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law put her on notice that the force employed was excessive. Because “historical facts material to the qualified immunity determination are in dispute,” Conner v. Heiman, 672 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on the excessive force claim.

. . .

The factual record on the excessive force claim is not fully developed. The parties, for example, agree that the deputies entered Cameron’s residence with guns drawn, but dispute whether deputies pointed their guns at Cameron’s head. Although Cameron conceded that Craig is not personally liable for her deputies pointing guns at Cameron’s head, Cameron asserted at oral argument that Craig is liable for directly participating in the raid and in organizing it to take place at such a time and in such a manner as to be maximally intimidating. “[W]hen the disputed facts and inferences are treated in the manner required by law,” that is, construed in Cameron’s favor, “a jury could properly find that the force used [was] greater than was reasonable under the circumstances.” Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 846 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted and second alteration in original). Cameron’s suspected crimes were relatively minor and non-violent, the County Defendants had no reason to suspect Cameron or any of her known roommates would pose a threat to officer safety, and Cameron was not resisting arrest. The County Defendants presented no evidence to the contrary.

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