Defendant cannot adopt government’s facts for one purpose and disclaim them for another; here it was standing

Evidence of defendant being the leaseholder was conflicting. “Bruce Bell cannot adopt the government’s evidence that he leased the front Tyler Street apartment for the limited purpose of establishing standing while challenging the validity of this same evidence. Notwithstanding the government’s evidence to the contrary, Bruce Bell has consistently denied any leasehold or interest in the front Tyler Street apartment, and we thus conclude that the district court’s finding that he lacked a subjective expectation of privacy was not clearly erroneous.” His claim of guest standing was also unavailing. United States v. Bell, 218 Fed. Appx. 885 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).

Denial of qualified immunity in a denial of summary judgment for a police officer that turns on a question of fact is not appealable. The appeals court actually lacks jurisdiction. Martin v. Tipton, 222 Fed. Appx. 366 (5th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).

It was objectively reasonable for the police to believe that defendant’s girlfriend who called the police on her boyfriend to get him and his firearms out of her house when she gave them the key to go in. United States v. Robinson, 217 Fed. Appx. 503 (6th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished):

Ms. Sampson’s consent was freely and voluntarily given as she had initiated the contact with the police and she gave Officer Golden the key to her house without him having made any such request. (J.A. 45-46, 72, 74, 88.) While the district court found the search lawful, the district court did not make an explicit finding as to the scope of consent as it related to the firearms. (J.A. 90.) By advising the police that defendant had firearms and then providing Officer Golden with a key Ms. Sampson was implicitly consenting to the officers searching for the firearms. If a person advises a police officer that there is a potentially dangerous person in her house, that the person is in possession of firearms and then consents to a search of her house, an objectively reasonable person would expect the officer to search for both the potentially dangerous person and the firearms. This objectively reasonable expectation derives from the threat posed by the potentially dangerous person being increased by that person’s possession of firearms. In consideration of this, the district court’s conclusion that Ms. Sampson consented to the search for the firearms is not clearly erroneous. Given that Ms. Sampson consented to the search for the firearms, the district court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the firearms.