Order for writ of execution did not justify eviction; eviction violated the Fourth Amendment

Officer’s eviction of plaintiff under a writ of execution, meaning only that the property was to be sold, was a Fourth Amendment violation. Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273 (6th Cir. 2007):

Revis asserts, in addition to his due process claim, that his eviction violated the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable seizure of his residence. In light of Soldal, 506 U.S. at 72, and Thomas, 304 F.3d at 576, Deputy Eaton’s actions in physically taking possession of Revis’s house by having the locks changed, retaining a key, and evicting Revis demonstrably effected a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Soldal, 506 U.S. at 61 (holding that a seizure under the Fourth Amendment had occurred when police “unceremoniously dispossessed” a resident of his trailer home by authorizing its physical removal); cf. Thomas, 304 F.3d at 582 (questioning whether verbally ordering the tenants to leave and escorting them out was a seizure of the residence where the officers did not take physical possession of the property) (Gilman, J., writing for the court on this point separately from the lead opinion).

Deputy Eaton’s reliance on dicta in Soldal is misplaced. There, the Court noted that “had the ejection in this case properly awaited the state court’s judgment it is quite unlikely that the federal court would have bothered with a § 1983 claim alleging a Fourth Amendment violation.” Soldal, 506 U.S. at 71. The “state court’s judgment” that the Court advised waiting for in that case, however, referred to a judgment for possession pursuant to a state-court eviction proceeding pending at the time the trailer home was seized. Id. at 58. Thus, Soldal simply begs the question of whether the court’s writ of execution in this case entitled Eaton to evict Revis.

You have to get hurt to make an excessive force claim: Plaintiff’s excessive force claim failed. He was wrestled to the ground because he did not immediately stop his car and he did not reasonably respond to officer’s orders when he was stopped. He required no medical treatment and complained of no discomfort. The entire occurrence was on the patrol car video. McGee v. City of Cincinnati Police Dept., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28665 (S.D. Ohio April 18, 2007).

In a consent search of a vehicle, scarred screwheads gave cause to remove them. United States v. Ferrer-Montoya, 483 F.3d 565 (8th Cir. 2007).*

District court did not err in finding that third party had authority to consent to a search. She rented the apartment for one of the defendants but she made it clear to the manager that she could come and go at will. That gave her apparent authority. United States v. Garcia-Jaimes, 484 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2007).*