CA1: While the area involved is not determinative, it is a factor in reasonable suspicion.

Here, officers were surveilling an area known for its drug trafficking, and they saw what was likely a drug deal going down. The fact that it could have also been a legitimate transaction had to be considered with the place. It turned out that this was a gun sale, not a drug deal, but that was of “no constitutional significance.” United States v. Rabbia, 699 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2012):

Although the behavior in question also could have been consistent with legitimate commercial activity, the circumstances “reasonably supported a more sinister explanation.” Brake, 666 F.3d at 805; see also United States v. Stanley, 915 F.2d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Under Terry, the test is whether the circumstances give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, not whether the defendant’s actions are subject to no reasonable innocent explanation.”); cf. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000) (“Even in Terry, the conduct justifying the stop was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation.”).

Here, those circumstances included Rabbia’s presence late at night in an area known to be a hotbed of drug activity. On its own, of course, the character of the location where a stop occurs “is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion,” United States v. Am, 564 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2009), and we do not suggest that residents of poorer urban neighborhoods, where crime typically is more prevalent than in nearby suburban communities, may be detained on suspicion of criminal activity simply because of where they live. See United States v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1165, 357 U.S. App. D.C. 339 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (stating that “an individual’s presence in [a certain neighborhood], ‘standing alone, is not enough to support reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime'” (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124)). However, “officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. Accordingly, Rabbia’s presence at 11:00 p.m. in a neighborhood with a high incidence of drug crimes is a relevant consideration supporting the reasonableness of the detectives’ suspicion that he was involved in a drug deal. See id.; Am, 564 F.3d at 30 (noting that location “is clearly a consideration that a police officer may use to decide to make a Terry stop” (quoting United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

It is of no constitutional significance that, as it turned out, Rabbia was involved in an illicit gun sale, not a drug deal. …