S.D.Fla.: Lesson about specificity motions to suppress; inspecific motion held against defendant’s credibility on the search

The court finds the defendant consented after an illegal search of his luggage. (Why is important, and this is an important lesson.) United States v. Jimenez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148699 (S.D. N.Y. October 10, 2012) (Judge Swain):

Jimenez admitted at the hearing that he assented to Veloz’s request to search the luggage after signing the Miranda waiver form. However, he asserts that he was detained by the Miami-Dade law enforcement officers and consented to the search against his will. He testified as to the following at the hearing in support of his claim of coercion: (1) he was approached in the airport by officers with guns drawn; (2) he was made to sit on the floor until other officers arrived; (3) Veloz asked him “firmly” to accompany him to a room for questioning; (4) he was not told he could get a lawyer at that moment; (5) he was not told that he could withhold consent; and (6) he did not understand the Miranda warnings. Jimenez also asserts that he “really didn’t have any other choice” but to consent to the search because it was apparent from Detective Veloz’s questions about the money in the luggage that he had already executed a search and knew what the luggage contained. The Government and Detective Veloz dispute each of these claims.

As noted above, the Court does not find credible Jimenez’s assertions at the hearing — which are glaringly absent from his moving papers — that he was held at gun point or otherwise prevented from leaving, and that Detective Veloz revealed that he already knew what was in the luggage prior to obtaining Jimenez’s consent to conduct a search.