Officers collectively had probable cause to believe that defendant was transporting drugs when he drove off from their surveillance, and they called for a uniform officer to stop the defendant. The officers were not required to tell the officer making the stop what the probable cause was; all that is required is that there be probable cause. United States v. Covarrubias, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199 (D. Ore. January 4, 2007):
All of these cases [cited by the defense], however, are distinguishable from this matter because they involved an assessment of probable cause or reasonable suspicion developing in the field under quickly evolving and uncertain circumstances. Here, on the other hand, it is undisputed that the JTF and DEA officers already had probable cause to stop and to search Defendant’s vehicle and to arrest him when they called for the “walled off” stop of Defendant’s vehicle. In addition, probable cause in this case grew out of a long-term, judicially supervised, multi-agency investigation instead of a quick assessment of rapidly evolving circumstances. Moreover, although the trial courts in each of these cases relied on by Defendant interpreted the collective-knowledge doctrine to require, at the least, communication of the existence of probable cause to the arresting officer, none of these interpretations of the collective-knowledge rule has been reviewed by an appellate court. Indeed, in the Ninth Circuit, it appears
“there is room in our precedent to conclude that the collective knowledge of law enforcement can support reasonable suspicion, even if the information known to others is not communicated to the detaining officer prior to a Terry stop, cf. United States v. Butler, 74 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 1996)(holding that “collective knowledge of police officers involved in an investigation, even if some of the information known to other officers is not communicated to the arresting officer” can establish probable cause)….”
United States v. Terry-Crespo, 356 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, in the absence of clear guidance from the Ninth Circuit, this Court does not find the reasoning of the decisions on which Defendant relies to be persuasive under these particular circumstances.
Evidence supported the USMJ’s R&R conclusion that defendant abandoned his hotel room. He had packed up to leave, attached his companion, and fled the area. United States v. James, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187 (D. Minn. January 3, 2007):
James also contends that Judge Graham erred in concluding that he abandoned his room at the Excel Inn. James relies primarily on United States v. Hoey, 983 F.2d 890, 893 (8th Cir. 1993), in which the court found that the defendant had abandoned her apartment because she was six weeks behind in paying rent, had held a moving sale, and was seen leaving. James points to differences between Hoey’s situation and his situation — such as the fact that he had reserved his hotel room through the following day — and argues that these differences compel a finding that he had not abandoned his hotel room in the way that Hoey had abandoned her apartment.
In determining whether property was abandoned for Fourth Amendment purposes, courts consider all of the circumstances at the time of the alleged abandonment. Id. at 892. The facts of this case — while indeed different from the facts in Hoey — are more than sufficient to demonstrate that James had abandoned his room at the Excel Inn. Residence in a hotel room is almost by definition transient; in contrast, residence in an apartment is typically long-term. The type of evidence necessary to show that an individual has abandoned an apartment will thus differ from the type of evidence needed to establish that a hotel room has been abandoned. Even putting that difference aside, the evidence of abandonment here is at least as strong as that in Hoey. James had packed up his belongings and was in the process of leaving when he attacked his companion and fled the hotel. Based on this evidence, the Court finds that James had abandoned his room at the Excel Inn.
Two habeas cases from Michigan: Petitioner was afforded a full opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim because Michigan courts do not default search and seizure claims not made in the trial court. No motion was made here, but it was decided on the merits on appeal, and that satisfies Stone v. Powell. Mendoza v. Berghuis, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164 (E.D. Mich. January 4, 2007).* “The relevant inquiry is whether a habeas petitioner had an opportunity to litigate his claims, not whether he in fact did so or even whether the Fourth Amendment claim was correctly decided. See Wynne v. Renico, 279 F. Supp. 2d 866, 892 (E.D. Mich. 2003).” Calicut v. Quigley, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166 (E.D. Mich. January 3, 2007).*
