D.Kan.: Defendant’s wife had full access to consent to search of defendant’s computer

Based on representations from defendant’s wife and all the police officers knew, she had apparent authority to consent to a search of what they believed was the family computer. It was not locked with a password, and she had full access to it. The after-acquired facts were not enough to undermine what they knew at the time. United States v. Schuler, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30512 (D. Kan. March 8, 2012):

The court heard the testimony of Mrs. Schuler and Officer Crawford. The court also heard the testimony of defendant. The court has reviewed the parties’ briefs and the applicable law. The court does not believe that Officer Crawford was presented with an ambiguous situation here, nor was he required to make further inquiry. Mrs. Schuler had retrieved her husband’s laptop from their home, had it in her possession, and provided it to officers–on and unlocked–explaining that she believed it was used to write the letters and/or that it contained the letters, although she was not able to find them on it. The computer was in her care, custody, and control when she provided it to officers and consented to their search of it.

It is true that police only later learned more facts that would either support or undermine Mrs. Schuler’s authority to consent to the search, such as where the laptop was kept; whether Mrs. Schumer had previously been provided a password (or whether any password was actually required); and whether she occasionally used the laptop. However, the critical inquiry is what police knew at the time consent was given. Sanchez, 608 F.3d at 689, n.1 (noting that reasonableness of officer’s belief that a third party has authority to consent is an objective inquiry, “based on the ‘facts available to the officer at the moment,'” quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990)); United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 722 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that “[a]ny after-acquired factual knowledge that ‘might undermine the initial reasonable conclusion of third-party apparent authority [is] generally immaterial,'” (quotation omitted)). The court need not resolve contradictions in the hearing testimony because these additional facts are not relevant to the inquiry. The court agrees with the government that, at the time and under the circumstances in which Mrs. Schuler gave consent to search, it was reasonable for Officer Crawford to believe that she had authority to do so.