After a warrant for electronics was suppressed, a second was obtained with the same evidence claiming independent source. The Court of Appeals is so troubled by this that it certifies the case to the Supreme Court to sort it out. State v. Lancial, 2026 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1248 (Nov. 17, 2026)* (a fascinating opinion, but not yet on court’s website):
The State’s reliance on the independent source doctrine here is unique for the following reasons: (1) the source of the evidence is a cell phone that was continuously in law enforcement’s possession; (2) police sought a second search of the exact same phone searched the first time, for the exact same evidence that was uncovered during the first search, using the exact same probable cause; (3) the search came after the defendant had already been tried and convicted of the crime of possession of child pornography; and (4) the evidence giving rise to that conviction was ordered suppressed by an appellate court. Accordingly, we question whether the evidence obtained was truly from an independent source or whether the State’s actions reveal an untenable constitutional loophole to the exclusionary rule. This is a question of statewide importance because if the independent source doctrine applies under these circumstances, it is likely that the State will utilize this procedure in future cases. Therefore, litigants, attorneys, and lower courts throughout the state would benefit greatly from a definitive decision on the issue by the state’s highest court.
In order to answer the above question regarding the independent source doctrine, however, we believe it is important to first consider whether, as Lancial claims, law enforcement’s affidavit for the second search failed to include sufficient facts to support a finding of probable cause to believe that his cell phone contained evidence of the crime of possession of child pornography or whether, given the significant privacy interest that the case law recognizes in modern cell phones, police had no legal basis—separate from the residence where the phone was found—to search his cell phone. And, relatedly, we must also consider whether the circuit court’s order authorizing the search was erroneous because it failed to specifically identify the device being searched and allowed a broad search of the device without identifying the nature of the evidence sought and its nexus to the crime of possession of child pornography.
The State, in contrast, asserts that the search warrant affidavit contained enough information for the circuit court to make separate and independent inferences in support of probable cause, that a reasonable officer conducting the search would be able to discern the crime at issue and the evidence sought, and that the affidavit and the order can be considered together to create the necessary basis for a probable cause finding and nexus to the crime. Accordingly, the State argues, the court did not err by denying Lancial’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the second search. Thus, this case presents an important, novel, and active legal question regarding the sufficiency of a search warrant affidavit and the scope of an order authorizing the seizure of the contents of a cell phone and the search of those contents, particularly where the crime being investigated might necessitate an extensive search of the digital device.
If it is determined that the search warrant affidavit lacked sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause to seize and search the contents of Lancial’s phone, and that the circuit court’s resulting order to search the cell phone failed the particularity requirement, then those facts weigh on whether the independent source doctrine was correctly applied. Lancial contends that absent the first unlawful search and the evidence it uncovered, the State would not have sought a second search of his cell phone. Relatedly, and given the deficiencies in the supporting affidavit and the court’s order, he contends that the court would not have authorized the second search but for its knowledge of the first search and its results. Thus, the second search did not genuinely result from an independent source, but was instead a search tainted by the results of the first search.
And, finally, in the alternative, we question whether all of the above considerations are eclipsed by application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. In other words, regardless of whether the independent source doctrine was properly applied, the affidavit was insufficient, and the order was impermissibly overbroad, or whether the law of the case should control to suppress the evidence, would the good-faith exception apply? And if it did, would its application effectively swallow the exclusionary rule? Accordingly, we certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.