VA: Reverse keyword search warrant to Google decided on GFE but not merits

Reverse keyword search warrant to Google connected defendant to this crime. It’s not like geofence warrants in Chatrie, but the merits aren’t decided because the good faith exception applies in any event. Clements v. Commonwealth, 2026 Va. App. LEXIS 428 (Aug. 11, 2026). (You never have to decide the merits as long as you can go back to the good faith exception.)

This particular reverse-keyword search warrant is distinguishable from the geofencing warrant considered in Chatrie v. United States, 609 U.S. ___ (2026). There, law enforcement officers obtained a single warrant for data from Google, attempting to cut the judicial system out of the investigatory process thereafter. Id. at (Jackson, J., concurring). They were allowed to access information beyond the scope of the geofence, and they were subject to no duty to narrow their search upon receiving anonymized data from Google. Id. at ___. That same lack of judicial oversight does not exist here. The law enforcement officers in this case narrowly tailored their search to the specific facts of the case and identified precise and limited information. And, importantly, they sought the court’s authorization at each step by obtaining a new warrant in light of the information received from Google in the first instance. This multi-step approach dispels the concerns expressed in Chatrie about supplying a Sovereign with unfettered “access [to] all of a cell-phone user’s movements” such that she would wield a “virtual panopticon with which to scrutinize [] citizens’ activities.” Id. at .

We recognize the gravity of this constitutional question, but we must emphasize that we express no view today on the constitutional validity of reverse-keyword search warrants. That question may ultimately warrant resolution in an appropriate case. Although the concurrence offers a thoughtful discussion of the issue, there is no dispute that the good-faith exception resolves this appeal without requiring us to reach the underlying constitutional question. Addressing the constitutional question under these circumstances would abandon our obligation to exercise judicial restraint by deciding cases “on the best and narrowest grounds” and thus avoiding the “unnecessary adjudication of a constitutional issue.” Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015) (first quoting McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620, 626 n.4 (2010); and then quoting Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 203 (2002)); see also Siler v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909) (“Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed from without important reasons.”). This conclusion applies a fortiori to constitutional questions since “[n]o questions can be brought before a judicial tribunal of greater delicacy than those which involve” constitutionality. See McKeithen v. City of Richmond, 302 Va. 422, 435 n.2 (2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833)). So, although jurists are entitled to voice any concern in a separate writing, principles of judicial restraint and constitutional avoidance still operate to limit our discussions to the issues actually before the Court.