The standard of appellate review as to voluntariness reflects independent judicial review, often following Miller v. Fenton (review of voluntariness of confession) and Ornelas v. United States (review of probable cause and reasonable suspicion) is de novo. See, e.g.:
United States v. Stewart, 93 F.3d 189, 192 (5th Cir.1996)
United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 536 (6th Cir. 2008)
United States v. Starr, 533 F.3d 985, 995 (8th Cir. 2008)
United States v. Fiorillo, 186 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1993) (“if we are determining whether specific types of actions are sufficient to give rise to an inference of consent, the standard of review is de novo.”)
Phuagnong v. State, 714 So.2d 527, 529–30 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (relying on Miller and Ornelas to hold that “[t]he same reasoning supports independent appellate review where the validity of a search has been found to rest … on consent”)
Luna–Martinez v. State, 984 So.2d 592, 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008), review denied, 11 So.3d 942 (Fla. 2009)
State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶ 18, 1 A.3d 445, 454-55 (2010) (holding that voluntariness of consent to search presents an “analogous” issue to voluntariness of a confession and thus, as in Miller, presents a “legal question that we will review de novo”)
Turner v. State, 133 Md.App. 192, 754 A.2d 1074, 1080 (2000) (relying on Ornelas to hold that consent to search implicates a “constitutionally protected right” requiring independent review (quotation omitted))
State v. Stevens, 311 Or. 119, 806 P.2d 92, 103 (1991) (a reviewing court has a “duty to interpret constitutional standards and require conformance thereto” and concluding that, as to voluntariness of consent to search, reviewing court must “assess anew whether the facts suffice to meet constitutional standards”)
State v. Shelton, 990 A.2d 191, 199 (R.I. 2010) (relying on Ornelas to hold that “the voluntariness of an individual’s consent to search is reviewed by this Court de novo”)
Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 559-60 & n. 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
State v. Weisler, 2011 VT 96, 190 Vt. 344, 35 A.3d 970, ¶ 20 (2011)
State v. Stokes, 332 Wis.2d 315, 797 N.W.2d 934 (table), 2011 WL 292144, 2011 WI App 44 (2011) (unpublished)
Actual or apparent authority to consent should also be subject to the same de novo standard of review. See, e.g.:
United States v. Gevedon, 214 F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Ladell, 127 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 1997)
Smith v. Heimer, 35 Fed.Appx. 293, 294 (8th Cir. 2002) (§ 1983 case)
United States v. Mullen, 329 Fed.Appx. 61, 64 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v. Ruiz, 428 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Fiorillo, 186 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 1999)
United States v. Trotter, 483 F.3d 694, 698 (10th Cir. 2007)
State v. Thompson, 578 N.W.2d 734, 740-41 (Minn. 1998)
Limon v. State, 340 S.W.3d 753, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 559-60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
This will be § 11.12 of the Fourth Edition, when I can finish it.
