The First Circuit held yesterday that Hudson v. Michigan has to apply to arrest warrants. United States v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194 (1st Cir. November 28, 2006):
During its last term, the Supreme Court held that a violation of the “knock and announce” rule in the course of executing a search warrant did not justify the suppression of evidence subsequently discovered. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2006). This appeal requires us to determine whether Hudson should be extended to a knock and announce violation committed in the course of executing an arrest warrant. We conclude that the Hudson Court’s reasoning mandates such an extension.
. . .
It is black-letter law that an arrest warrant carries with it, by implication, a limited grant of authority to enter the target’s residence so long as there is reason to believe that the target is inside. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980). Generally speaking, this principle extends to the target’s hotel or motel room, since such an accommodation is akin to a temporary residence. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964); United States v. Beaudoin, 362 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Weems, 322 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting in dictum that if the defendant “effectively lived” where he was found, “the arrest warrant itself would be enough to authorize entry . . . to effectuate his arrest”).
Accidental finding of child porn in a box in a university storage room that could be linked to plaintiff led to a seizure of the hard drive from plaintiff’s university office computer to determine whether the university’s computer policy had been violated. The campus police made the seizure and search, and it was with reasonable suspicion. The defendants have qualified immunity. Soderstrand v. Oklahoma ex rel. Board of Regents of Oklahoma Agric. & Mech. Colleges, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85402 (W.D. Okla. November 22, 2006).
Defendant providing officer a counterfeit green card was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Quintanilla, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85314 (W.D. Pa. November 22, 2006).*
Call about a drug dealer did not constitute reasonable suspicion for a stop when it did not describe a person or a particular place. United States v. Martin, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85436 (M.D. Tenn. November 22, 2006):
The deputies had received a dispatch from someone who identified herself as Christina Beasley. There is no suggestion that this individual was known by these officers, let alone that she was a credible individual. Even assuming Beasley was credible, all she reported was that “he” was using or selling drugs in the house. The officers had absolutely no description of the purported drug user or seller. Even the location of the house was not established by the call and the trace only narrowed the location to two different houses.
W.D. Tenn., with prior encouragement from the Sixth Circuit, conflates probable cause determination into the good faith exception and essentially decides them as one question, of course finding that the GFE applies. United States v. Keller, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85438 (W.D. Tenn. November 22, 2006):
In this case, the affiant averred before the issuing judge that the alleged victim told him her father had sexual intercourse and viewed pornographic movies, books and pictures with her. Therefore, he sought a warrant to search Keller’s residence for “pornographic movies, magazines and electronic photographs stored on a computer.” (Trans., Ex. 1) While there is some factual basis for a probable cause finding as to the computer, it is a close question. Nonetheless, pornographic movies and pictures could be found or stored on a computer which was located inside the Defendant’s house. See Davis, 111 F.3d at 1478-79 (search warrant directing officers to search for items pertaining to the display of pornographic material in violation of state obscenity law encompassed computer equipment falling into that category, as the item was one that might be evidence of such activity). The issue need not be resolved, however, as the evidence of pornography contained on the computer escapes exclusion by virtue of the good faith exception to the warrant requirement articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), even if the nexus between the computer and the pornographic images alleged were too tenuous to establish probable cause. See United States v. McCraven, 401 F.3d 693, 698 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 639, 163 L.Ed.2d 517 (2005) (close question of whether warrant supported by probable cause need not be resolved because denial of motion to suppress proper under Leon); see also Irving, 452 F.3d at 125 (“in a doubtful case, we accord preference to the warrant”). The Leon exception “allows for the inclusion of evidence obtained by an invalid warrant if the officers reasonably and in good faith relied on the warrant at the time the search was conducted.” United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 480 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405). “The relevant question is ‘whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.” McCraven, 401 F.3d at 698 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23, 104 S.Ct. 3405). “The rationale behind the exception is that the exclusionary rule is meant to deter unlawful police conduct.” United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 578 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 446, 75 U.S.L.W. 3106, 75 U.S.L.W. 3204, 75 U.S.L.W. 3205 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2006) (No. 06-348).
