D.Neb.: Lawyering up does not prohibit the police from asking for consent

Defendant invoked her right to remain silent. Asking for consent after that did not violate the Fifth Amendment and Miranda. United States v. Ignacio-Lorenzo, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89780 (D. Neb. July 14, 2011):

While Ignacio-Lorenzo invoked her right to remain silent, Agent Farris and Officer Burns did not violate that right when they asked her to consent to a locker search. “The [Fifth Amendment] privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.” Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). “A consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement; it is not itself evidence of a testimonial and communicative nature.” United States v. Hidalgo, 7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Smith v. Wainwright, 581 F.2d 1149, 1152 (5th Cir. 1976)). Therefore, requesting to search is not interrogation within meaning of Miranda. Cody v. Solem, 755 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1985;) see United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251 (7th Cir. 1996;) United States v. Rodriguez-Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563 (10th Cir. 1993). Agent Farris and Officer Burns did not violate Ignacio-Lorenzo’s right to remain silent by asking her to consent to a locker search. See Hidalgo, 7 F.3d at 1568 (noting while consent led to introduction of incriminating physical evidence, there was no incriminating statement obtained after invoking the right to silence).

Dumping property in flight from the police, at least without an attempt to conceal it, is an abandonment. United States v. Herrera, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89783 (D. Neb. June 10, 2011).*

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