TX: Answer to question at time of arrest in hot pursuit after a stabbing, “Where’s the knife?”, was valid under public safety exception

A Texas court holds that an unMirandized question to a detainee who fled a stabbing “Where’s the knife?” was valid under the public safety exception. The officer saw defendant’s vehicle flee from a crowd where a man who had been stabbed was lying on the ground. When he caught the defendant, as he was handcuffing him, he asked “Where’s the knife?” and the defendant told him he dropped it in the crowd. Russell v. State, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 9997 (Tex. App. — Waco November 15, 2006):

From these cases, it is clear that the public safety exception is merely an exception to the prophylactic requirements that Miranda warnings be given but not an exception to the substantive rights found in the Fifth Amendment. The privilege against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment and the constitutionally mandated Miranda rights are implicated by a custodial interrogation, regardless of whether the accused has been made aware of them. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 481-82, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1883, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981). Thus, we conclude that the public safety exception simply allows police to forego the reading of Miranda warnings, but the situation, nonetheless, is a custodial interrogation implicating one’s constitutional rights.

Less intrusive measures for inventory not required where the defendant was arrested from driving without a license and the vehicle would be left on the side of the road until the defendant could get out and reclaim it. Jones v. State, 856 N.E.2d 758 (Ind. App. November 15, 2006)*:

Regarding the first part of the community caretaking function test, the belief that the vehicle posed a threat or harm to the community, Jones argues that, as in Taylor, his car was not in an illegal location and did not pose a hazard to other drivers. He asserts that this is evidenced by the fact that it is common to see vehicles parked on the side of the road and that he was detained on the side of the road for over an hour. He contends that pursuant to Taylor, the proper procedure was for a police officer to move his car or allow him to contact a friend or relative to move the car.

We cannot agree with Jones’s suggestion that Taylor requires police officers to move a dangerously parked car themselves or to allow the driver to contact a friend to move the car. Although our supreme court does reference these options, the context of these references involved cars safely parked in parking lots or on private property, not cars parked on the paved shoulder of a highway. See id. at 332, 333.