W.D.N.C.: Defendant’s disclaimer of ownership helped show he did not refuse consent; Randolph likely does not apply to cars, but that issue doesn’t have to be decided

Defendant disclaimed ownership of the car he was in saying that it was his mother’s, and that’s why he did not consent to search of her car he was in. By his own admission, his mother as owner of the car could consent to its search. He did not really refuse consent. He did have standing to contest the search of the car. United States v. Ingram, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139041 (W.D. N.C. December 28, 2010). He argued Georgia v. Randolph prevented them from asking her after he refused, but he did not refuse. The court also notes, without having to decide, that Randolph may only apply to the home. Note 3:

Even if Defendant had refused consent, it is not clear that Randolph would extend beyond the home.

A careful reading of the Supreme Court’s decision in Randolph reveals that it was limited to “the circumstances here at issue”–-a search of a home undertaken as a result of consent given by one co-tenant in the face of a present co-tenant’s objection. See id. at 106-08. The majority’s opinion turned primarily on the understanding that Fourth Amendment reasonableness is based upon “the great significance given to widely shared social expectations, which are naturally enough influenced by the law of property, but not controlled by its rules.” Id. at 110 (citations omitted). The Court reasoned that because “there is no common understanding that one co-tenant generally has a right or authority to prevail over the express wishes of another,” it followed that no co-tenant had the right to admit a guest over another tenant’s objection. Id. at 114-15. Ultimately, the Court’s focus was on the traditional import given to the house:

Since we hold to the centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home, it is beyond dispute that the home is entitled to special protection as the center of the private lives of our people. We have, after all, lived our whole national history with an understanding of the ancient adage that a man’s house is his castle to the point that the poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown.

Id. at 115 (internal quotations omitted).

Because it is well-established that vehicles do not enjoy the same privileges as the home, see, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148, it is not evident from its face that Randolph applies in the context of vehicles. Instead, the “widely shared social expectations” surrounding vehicles and shared chattel would, if anything, counsel against applying Randolph to that context, particularly in light of the Court’s focus on the relationship that exists between co-tenants of real property. See United States v. King, 604 F.3d 125, 136 (3d Cir. 2010) (“our reading of Justice Souter’s opinion for the Court, Justice Breyer’s concurrence, and Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent, leads us to conclude that the rule of law established in Randolph does not extend beyond the home”); see also Randolph, 547 U.S. at 131-32 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing that the “social expectation” that accompanies “shared information, papers, [or] containers … is that privacy has been shared with another,” and therefore one assumes the risk that the confidante will share access with a third-party, such as the police); but see United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2008) (“there is no reason that the rule in Randolph should be limited to residences”).

Ultimately, the Court need not decide this question, however, because it has already held that Randolph does not apply to the facts of this case.