CA2: Just because officers couldn’t agree on def’s words of consent doesn’t mean there wasn’t consent

Just because none of the officers could recall the exact words used, they were consistent that defendant consented, and the district court’s crediting that was entitled to substantial weight. United States v. Frye, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 28465 (2d Cir. Sept. 8, 2020):

Frye argues that the officers’ inability to recall the precise words used by Granderson prior to the search necessarily precluded a finding of voluntary consent. But numerous officers testified that, although Granderson initially stated that she could not give them permission to enter, she subsequently opened the door, stood to the side, and verbally indicated that they could enter the premises. As the district court noted, there was nothing in the record during the suppression hearing to suggest that this consent was coerced, since the officers clearly announced their presence, explained the purpose of their visit, and refrained from using forceful language when communicating with Granderson. Because we must “pay special deference to the district court’s factual determinations going to witness credibility,” United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 2013), Judge Geraci’s finding that the officers’ testimony was credible is entitled to substantial weight.