Police had a search warrant to obtain DNA. A search warrant implies that reasonable force might have to be used to execute it. A target can’t simply refuse to comply. State v. Evans, 2019 UT App 145, 2019 Utah App. LEXIS 147 (Aug. 23, 2019):
[*P18] Finally, Evans’s position—which would allow suspects to thwart, or at least delay, execution of a search warrant simply by resisting—has strong policy drawbacks. Many courts have noted that it makes little sense to incentivize noncompliance with (or active resistance to) the execution of search warrants. See, e.g., United States v. Bullock, 71 F.3d 171, 176 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that the suspect “had no right to resist execution of a search warrant” and that, due to his resistance, “he was the one who decided that physical force would be necessary”); United States v. Johnson, 462 F.2d 423, 427 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that “a person does not have the right to forcibly resist execution of a search warrant”); United States v. Jensen, No. CR. 08-50031, 2010 WL 11537913, at *36 (D.S.D. Feb. 12, 2010) (stating that a defendant “cannot resist a lawfully-executed search warrant and then be rewarded for his conduct with the exclusion of potentially-incriminating evidence”); Clary, 2 P.3d at 1261 (stating that the “defendant had no right to resist service of a court order authorizing extraction of his blood,” and that “[w]hen he refused to [voluntarily submit], he left the officers no alternative but to overcome his resistance with reasonable force”); Carr v. State, 728 N.E.2d 125, 129 (Ind. 2000) (stating that the law should not “create an incentive to refuse to comply with valid search warrants”). Institution of a legal rule under which officers would be compelled, upon encountering resistance to the execution of a warrant, to return to the magistrate to obtain a specific authorization for the use of reasonable force would create just such a perverse incentive.
[*P19] For these reasons, we conclude that a validly issued search warrant carries with it an implicit authorization for the use of reasonable force, when necessary, in its execution. Even though the warrant in question here did not contain an express statement authorizing the use of reasonable force, such an authorization was implied in the issuance of the warrant, and officers did not need to return to the magistrate to obtain a second warrant containing specific instructions as to how it should be executed.