Officers had probable cause that child pornography came from a particular IP address that was linked to a street address. The search warrant was properly issued for the entire premises, and it did not need to list the target of the investigation by name to be particular. In addition, based on common understandings of the internet and computers and cell phones at home, it is no longer necessary for a search warrant affidavit to explain who it might be on any device in the home as the Tenth Circuit did in 2010. United States v. Laurezo, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74340 (D. N.M. May 2, 2019):
Notably, in the present case, the affidavit did not set forth a “discussion of computer technology,” purporting to inform the magistrate judge of the nexus between an IP address and the physical address. See Renigar, 613 F.3d at 994. However, nearly a decade has passed since the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Renigar, and the Court’s understanding of technology has developed to a point that the average person is familiar with how an IP address is traceable to a physical address. At this point, it is “common knowledge to judges (like other members of the public)” that internet activity can be traced using the subscriber’s IP address. See Reichling, 781 F.3d at 887-88. Moreover, the issuing magistrate judge is entitled to use common sense and draw reasonable inferences to determine the probability of criminal activity from the facts presented. See Nolan, 119 F.3d at 1183.
In sum, the evidence presented in the affidavit, in conjunction with a common-sense understanding of the use of the internet, is sufficient to establish a fair probability that evidence of child pornography would be found in the place to be searched and on any electronic devices capable of accessing the internet found inside. Thus, the search warrant authorizing seizure of all electronic devices located inside the 3809 Zinnia Road residence and the subsequent search warrant authorizing the search of the Samsung DUOS cellphone were supported by probable cause.