D.C.Cir.: DOT regulation requiring observation of urine test to prevent cheater satisfied Fourth Amendment

“Under Department of Transportation regulations, employees in the aviation, rail, motor carrier, mass transit, maritime and pipeline industries who either fail or refuse to take a drug test must successfully complete a drug treatment program and pass a series of urine tests as a condition of performing any safety-sensitive duties. To prevent cheating, the Department modified its regulations in 2008 to require that such tests be conducted under direct observation. Petitioners, a railway company and several transportation unions, challenge the revised regulation, arguing that it violates both the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fourth Amendment. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we find the Department’s considered justification for its policy neither arbitrary nor capricious, and although we recognize the highly intrusive nature of direct observation testing, we conclude that the regulation complies with the Fourth Amendment.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. United States DOT, 566 F.3d 200 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

Turning on lights to effect a stop is not per se a seizure. It has to be based on the totality. Here, it was. “It is instructive that Gallegos candidly testified that, if Ceballos had attempted to drive away when Gallegos engaged his lights and pulled up behind him, Gallegos would have chased him down and arrested him.” The officer admitted that he only had a hunch for the stop. Defendant’s statements were the product of an unreasonable stop. United States v. Ceballos, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108725 (D. N.M. December 24, 2008).* (Note: Whenever I had an indication from the prosecution that the stop was not a “seizure,” I just asked the officer on the stand: “If Mr. X had not stopped for you, what would you have done?” That always elicited a response that the defendant was not free to leave.)

Defendant’s driving pattern added to reasonable suspicion. He sped up to try to get away from the officer, but then slowed down so he could pass, all on a slippery road. There were five Hispanic men in a vehicle on an alien smuggling corridor. In addition, the men ignored the officer’s efforts to get their attention while driving next to them. United States v. Bautista-Silva, 567 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2009).

Search of defendant’s vehicle was justified by consent or the automobile exception with probable cause. United States v. Loera, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 10278 (7th Cir. May 15, 2009).*

Under the automobile exception, officers did not need a warrant for seizure of a vehicle on probable cause. The fact they had time to get a warrant does not matter because a warrantless seizure was permissible. United States v. Bautista, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40939 (W.D. Wash. April 29, 2009):

Finally, defendant contends that the seizure of the Volvo was improper because defendant had already been placed in custody and removed from the scene. Dkt. # 467 at 5. However, because there was probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband,fn5 officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment in seizing the vehicle pending authorization to search it the following day. The mere fact that the officers could have obtained the warrant at an earlier time does not render the search or seizure invalid.

5. See Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 3 (1980); Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (“[U]nder our established precedent, the ‘automobile exception’ has no separate exigency requirement.”)

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