CA10: Successful suppression of evidence is not a “favorable outcome” for malicious prosecution purposes against the prosecutor; QI granted

Successful suppression of evidence is not a “favorable outcome” for malicious prosecution purposes against the prosecutor. It doesn’t show actual innocence. Margheim v. Buljko, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7421 (10th Cir. April 27, 2017):

Dismissal of the Drug Case was not a favorable termination for malicious prosecution purposes. To count as favorable, “the termination must in some way indicate the innocence of the accused.” Cordova, 816 F.3d at 651 (quotations omitted). Mr. Margheim won a suppression motion to exclude the drug evidence. The prosecutor, lacking this evidence, dismissed the case. Dismissal based on the suppression of evidence “on ‘technical’ grounds having no or little relation to the evidence’s trustworthiness” is not “favorable” under our case law to support a malicious prosecution claim. Wilkins, 528 F.3d at 804 (quotations omitted). Mr. Margheim won his suppression motion because the arrest warrant that led to the search was invalid. He has not presented any information questioning whether he actually possessed the drugs or whether the substances found were anything other than illegal narcotics. See Aplt. App. at 133 (Mr. Margheim’s deposition testimony admitting police found narcotics in his possession when they arrested him). Under these circumstances, the dismissal of the Drug Case was not a favorable termination.

Mr. Margheim has thus failed to establish one of the five elements necessary for his malicious prosecution claim. See Wilkins, 528 F.3d at 799 (listing favorable termination among the elements of a malicious prosecution); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994) (“One element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused.”).

As a result, he has not established a constitutional violation and therefore cannot surmount the first part of his burden to overcome qualified immunity. See Snider v. Seung Lee, 584 F.3d 193, 201 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Because there was no favorable outcome … as necessary to support Snider’s malicious prosecution claim … Snider fails on the threshold inquiry of whether she alleged the violation of a constitutional right.”). Having established that Mr. Margheim failed to make out a constitutional violation, we need not address the clearly established law inquiry of the qualified immunity analysis.

We can conclude the district court erred in denying Ms. Buljko qualified immunity.

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