NY2: Burglar alarm wasn’t license to enter when objective facts at scene belied emergency

Police responded to a burglar alarm in Nassau County. At the house, they found the defendant working under a car. They inquired, and he claimed to be the son of the homeowner. He showed them his keys. He said he was going to the airport shortly to pick up his parents flying in from Florida. He claimed to be there regularly. There was no sign of a break in at all. He had no photo ID. The neighbor was home, but they weren’t asked if defendant was associated with the property. The police demanded entry to make sure that everything was alright, and inside was a firearm and two grenades, for which defendant was arrested. There was no objective evidence that there was anything amiss, other than the burglar alarm, and the officers admitted that the large majority they responded to were false alarms. People v. Ringel, 2016 NY Slip Op 08887, 2016 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8738 (2d Dept. Dec. 28, 2016):

That the police did not have the right to enter the house did not mean that they were required to simply walk away. We are not suggesting that the police were required to disregard any concerns they had about the safety of any occupants of the house brought about by the defendant’s nervousness. Investigation was appropriate, and the record shows that additional information was close at hand. One of the officers testified that there was a car running in the driveway of the house next door. Thus, the officer could have sought information from the neighbor regarding the defendant’s parents. Also, one of the officers was seeking information by speaking with the defendant’s sister on the defendant’s cell phone. At the suppression hearing, the defendant’s sister testified that she had told the officer, ” I’m coming right over. I’m in the next town, I’ll be over in two or three minutes.'” The officer had responded, “okay.” The defendant’s sister also testified that after she spoke to the officer she went to her parents’ house and that it had taken her “[f]our minutes, the most.”

When the police have an objectively reasonable ground for believing that there is an emergency, a warrantless entry permitted under the emergency doctrine is not retroactively rendered impermissible because there was, in fact, no emergency (see Michigan v Fisher, 558 U.S at 49). So, too, an impermissible entry is not rendered retroactively permissible when the police find evidence of criminality inside (see e.g. People v Mormon, 100 AD3d at 782-783). Were the law otherwise, seizures themselves, regardless of the circumstances leading up to them, would be all that mattered. In that event, the Fourth Amendment would no longer protect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” (US Const Amend IV).

In sum, the police officer’s entry into the house was not supported by objective facts giving rise to a reasonable belief that someone in the house required emergency assistance. Accordingly, the physical evidence recovered inside the house, as well as the statements that the defendant made to police officers after the unlawful entry, must be suppressed (see Wong Sun v United States, 371 U.S 471, 485; People v Hammett, 126 AD3d at 1000). Without that evidence, there could not be sufficient evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt and, therefore, the indictment must be dismissed (see People v Graham, 134 AD3d 1047, 1048).