IA: Where state stipulated needing PC for its actions, it couldn’t argue RS was sufficient on appeal; it’s bound by its argument below

Where the state argues reasonable suspicion justified the officer’s actions, they had to say so in the trial court. Instead, they proceeded on the theory they needed probable cause, and that’s what they’re bound by on appeal. State v. Steffens, 2016 Iowa App. LEXIS 1316 (Dec. 21, 2016):

The State argues on appeal the stop was lawful as Officer Ehlers had reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot, but the State then goes on to assert “the stop of [Steffens’s] vehicle was not made on mere reasonable suspicion of a completed misdemeanor; rather, the parties stipulated that the officer had probable cause.” The reasonable-suspicion argument was not raised before or addressed by the district court as a justification for the stop. Additionally, beyond this statement in its brief, the State makes no claim the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Insofar as the State claims the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, we find the State has not preserved the argument for our review. See, e.g., State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2015) (not considering any other theory because the “State did not assert that any other theory or exception to the warrant requirement justified the warrant-less search the officers performed”); State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 479-80 (Iowa 2014) (not considering consent on appeal because “the State did not argue that Short voluntarily consented to the search”); Tyler, 830 N.W.2d at 295 (noting State’s argument on appeal was not raised before the district court below and did not require its review but addressing argument because it had no merit); State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 291 (Iowa 2010) (“An argument not made on an issue before the district court is ordinarily waived.”). In any event, the State failed to present any evidence that Officer Ehlers had reasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity was afoot at the time of the stop. Consequently, the higher standard of probable cause was required to effectuate a constitutional seizure here. See King, 867 N.W.2d at 123.