Traffic stops may be based on reasonable suspicion

Traffic stops may be based on reasonable suspicion, and dictum in Whren is just that. United States v. Johnson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71494 n. 4(M.D. Pa. September 17, 2008):

In light of language from Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996), there has been some confusion regarding whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion is needed to effect a traffic stop. Compare id. at 810 (dictum) (decision to stop automobile is reasonable when police have probable cause) with Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (holding) (traffic stops require “at least” reasonable suspicion). The Third Circuit dispelled any such confusion in United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2006), when it held that reasonable suspicion–and not probable cause–is required for a “routine” traffic stop, id. at 397. As the traffic stop at issue here was not “routine,” the reasonableness of its scope is more fully addressed infra.

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