CA5: “criminal activity underfoot” was reasonable suspicion

Court seemingly confuses “criminal activity a foot” with “criminal activity underfoot.” Leaving a gun in a stranger’s car here was reasonable suspicion for further action. United States v. Cook, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 20339 (5th Cir. Nov. 11, 2016):

This argument ignores the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop. The officer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was underfoot when he stopped Cook for questioning after Cook left a .38 caliber revolver in a stranger’s car. It is well established that a police officer who is reasonably suspicious that criminal activity “may be afoot” is permitted to briefly detain a person to investigate the suspicious circumstances. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. As such, the officer was justified in stopping Cook and investigating further in light of the suspicious nature of Cook’s conduct.

Cook also challenges the voluntariness of his consent to the pat-down search. As the Government points out, though, Cook conceded this point before the district court. This court has held that “failure to raise specific issues or arguments in pre-trial suppression proceedings operates as a waiver of those issues or arguments for appeal.” United States v. Pope, 467 F.3d 912, 918-19 (5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original). As such, Cook has waived any challenge to the district court’s factual finding of voluntary consent to the pat-down search.