E.D.Va.: Def claimed on post-conviction defense counsel promised win on motion to suppress; hearing has to be held

Defendant in his 2255 claimed defense counsel promised that he could win a motion to suppress. Defense counsel denied it, saying he reviewed the file and told defendant it was a hopeless motion. A hearing has to be held. United States v. Harris, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130436 (E.D.Va. Sept. 21, 2016):

Here, the parties have offered conflicting evidence as to whether Bullard misadvised Harris about the likelihood of success on a motion to suppress prior to Harris’s rejection of the plea offer, as well as about his sentencing exposure if Harris decided to reject the plea offer and proceed to trial. Harris asserts that Bullard told him that he would file a motion to suppress and that, based upon this advice, he rejected a ten-year plea offer. (ECF No. 72-1, at 1.) Harris states, however, that Bullard never filed the motion. (Id.) Harris further asserts that Bullard never advised him that he faced a 600-month sentence if Harris chose to reject the plea offer and proceed to trial, and that Bullard was unaware of the fact that any sentences imposed for convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) would be consecutive to any other sentence. (ECF No. 74-4, at 1.) Three of Harris’s family members aver that Bullard informed them that Harris only faced between thirteen and eighteen years of imprisonment if he was found guilty. (ECF No. 76-2, at 1; ECF No. 76-3, at 1; [*12] ECF No. 76-5, at 1.) Bullard, however, contends that he told Harris that he would not be filing a motion to suppress, and that Harris’s decision to reject the plea offer “was not connected to any advice given to him regarding any suppression motions.” (Bullard Aff. ¶ 2.) Bullard’s Affidavit is silent with respect to Harris’s assertions regarding advice about his sentencing exposure.

This conflict raises factual issues that cannot be resolved on the current record, as a “determination that counsel’s advice… was a strategic one is a factual determination requiring a credibility determination, or at least the receipt of evidence outside of the present record.” United States v. Dickerson, 546 F. App’x 211,214 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see United States v. Robertson, 219 F. App’x 286,286 (4th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (noting that an evidentiary hearing is generally “required when a movant presents a colorable Sixth Amendment claim showing disputed material facts and a credibility determination is necessary to solve this issue”). Throughout his pleadings, Harris maintains that he would have accepted the plea offer if counsel had provided a more accurate prediction of the likelihood of success on a motion to suppress, as well as advice regarding his potential sentencing exposure should he choose to go to trial. The sentence Harris received was considerably greater than the ten-year sentence provided in the plea offer. The Court simply lacks enough information to determine whether Bullard reasonably advised Harris about the likelihood of success on a motion to suppress prior to Harris’s decision to reject the plea offer, as well as about potential sentencing exposure if he proceeded to trial. Accordingly, the Court is unable, at this juncture, to conclusively find that Harris is entitled to no relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Thus, Harris has made a sufficient threshold showing to warrant a hearing on these issues. Therefore, the Court will conduct an evidentiary hearing with respect to Claim One.

This entry was posted in Ineffective assistance. Bookmark the permalink.

Comments are closed.