SC: Destruction of innocent’s building to end hostage situation not inverse condemnation so no recovery

The City of Spartanburg ended a hostage situation in a convenience store by using a bulldozer to breach a wall. After it was over, the owner couldn’t afford to fix it, so the city condemned it and tore it down. The convenience store owner is entitled to no compensation because this law enforcement action was not inverse condemnation. Carolina Convenience Stores v. City of Spartanburg, 2016 S.C. LEXIS 265 (Aug. 31, 2016):

Whether there has been a taking by inverse condemnation within the meaning of the South Carolina Constitution is a question for the court. E.g., Carolina Chloride, Inc. v. Richland County, 394 S.C. 154, 714 S.E.2d 869 (2011). We reject Petitioners’ contention that the actions of the City’s police department constituted a taking, and join the majority of jurisdictions³ in holding that the South Carolina Constitution does not contemplate that damage occasioned to private property by law enforcement in the course of performing their duties constitutes a compensable taking. In interpreting S.C. Const. art. I, § 13(A), we are persuaded that the framers of the Constitution did not intend that law enforcement operate under the fear that their actions could lead to takings-based liability.

3. Whether a compensable taking has occurred in this context is a novel question in South Carolina. Other jurisdictions are split on the answer. Compare Brutsche v. City of Kent, 164 Wn.2d 664, 193 P.3d 110, 121 (Wash. 2008) (espousing the majority rule and holding the use of a battering ram to gain entry to execute a search warrant did not constitute a taking); Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s London Subscribing to Certificate No. TPCLDP217477 v. City of St. Petersburg, 864 So.2d 1145, 1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (applying the majority rule and finding damage to apartment caused by police use of “flash-bang” grenades in executing a search warrant did not constitute a taking under just compensation clause and any recovery for damages was only available under state tort law) with Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., 479 N.W.2d 38 (Mo. 1992) (illustrating the minority position and holding that where an innocent third party’s property is damaged by the police in the course of apprehending a suspect, such action constitutes a compensable taking based on the language of Missouri’s Constitution).

We find the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis of Petitioners’ takings claim, which relied on its conclusion that there was no taking because the city did not physically appropriate the property for public use. Instead, we simply hold the damage to Petitioners’ property during the police department’s hostage rescue effort did not constitute a taking as contemplated by the South Carolina Constitution. In addition, we find the Court of Appeals erred in characterizing the police department’s actions as a “legitimate exercise of its police power.” As we have explained above, the term “police power” as it relates to eminent domain actions refers to the government’s authority to limit the use of private property through its regulatory authority, and thus has no relevance to the resolution of this matter.