W.D.Va.: A completed crime doesn’t preclude a Terry stop on reasonable suspicion

A completed crime doesn’t preclude a Terry stop on reasonable suspicion. Besides that, the court finds probable cause. United States v. Truth, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106651 (W.D.Va. Aug. 11, 2016):

The court is not persuaded by Kelley’s arguments. First of all, Kelley’s contention that a Terry stop may not be conducted based on a completed crime, or at least not based on a completed misdemeanor, is not accurate. At the hearing, the court asked defense counsel the authority he relied on for the proposition that a crime has to be ongoing to justify a Terry stop, and he cited to Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980). (Tr. 95.) To be sure, Reid uses the present tense, stating that a Terry stop is lawful if supported “by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity.” 448 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added). But both the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have expressed the standard much more broadly, describing a Terry stop as permissible “when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Montieth, 662 F.3d 660, 665 (4th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227 (1985)).

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