Defendant created a fictitious trade association and sent out bills, getting many checks back from thousands he mailed out. He had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the envelopes that he had not yet received because of the fictitious names. Moreover, the Postal Inspectors intercepted several of them and got consent from the senders to open them. United States v. Stokes, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12871 (1st Cir. July 13, 2016)*:
Stokes argues that he has Fourth Amendment standing by virtue of some of the envelopes bearing his “personal addresses” of Willard Street and Blaine Street. Stokes provides little support for his contention that an address alone can create a reasonable expectation of privacy in a parcel. Even if we were to accept this argument, he offers minimal information as to the nature of these addresses. A review of the record reveals that the Willard Street address corresponds to a mail-handling service and the Blaine Street address to a property purchased by Stokes in 2006. We do not know whether anyone else had access to these locations, what the nature of the delivery receptacle was, or any other information that could shed light on the reasonableness of his privacy interest. See id. at 857 (“The most intimate of documents, if left strewn about the most public of places, would surely not be shielded.”). Without more, Stokes cannot shoulder his burden of demonstrating that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in envelopes where he is not listed as an addressor or an addressee.