OH9: Potential suicide call justified entry; “ironclad proof” not required

A call about a potential suicide was justification for police entry into the house. They don’t need “ironclad proof” that a suicide might happen, just a reasonable belief. State v. Linder, 2016-Ohio-3435, 2016 Ohio App. LEXIS 2291 (9th Dist. June 15, 2016):

[*P11] Upon review of the facts of this case, we conclude that exigent circumstances justified Officer Hackathorn’s warrantless entry to the house. Although M.B. was allegedly seen walking around in the community earlier that day, Officer Hackathorn did not know whether that was before or after M.B. called J.S. to say that she was suicidal. By the time Officer Hackathorn reached M.B.’s location, at least several hours had passed. Officer Hackathorn had information that M.B. was addicted to heroin and that she had parked her car at a likely drug house. He also observed the reaction of the man who poked his head out of the side door of the house, who, upon seeing Officer Hackathorn, immediately retreated inside the house and locked the door, despite Officer Hackathorn’s order to stop. At that point, it was reasonable for Officer Hackathorn, who was only at the residence to check on the welfare of M.B., to presume that he was not going to receive cooperation from the occupants of the house. Because time could be of the essence if M.B. had followed through on her suicidal thoughts, a reasonable officer could believe that he would not have time to obtain a warrant. See State v. Croston, 4th Dist. Athens No. 01CA22, 2001-Ohio-2607, 2001 WL 1346130, *3 (Oct. 30, 2001) (noting that “time is often of the essence in emergency situations.”). Officer Hackathorn had also received information that J.S. had a reasonable belief that M.B. was in danger of self-inflicted harm.

[*P12] Officer Hackathorn did not need ironclad proof that M.B. had or was about to commit suicide for it to be reasonable for him to enter Mr. Linder’s house without a warrant. Although it is a close question, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that he did not violate Mr. Linder’s Fourth Amendment rights. Mr. Linder’s assignment of error is overruled.