D.P.R.: Under Payton, there’s a difference between where an arrestee “could be found” and “would be found”

Just because PRPD had two addresses for defendant as places he’d lived before didn’t give reason to believe he was there at the time they entered with an arrest warrant. That it “could be” a place he’d be found doesn’t mean that he “would be” found there. United States v. Santiago-Rodriguez, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71584 (D.P.R. June 1, 2016):

Grasping at straws, the United States argues that “a place where Hernandez ‘could be found’ is reasonably understood as a statement that [it is] his residence[] because most people cannot regularly be found in a home where they don’t live.” (Docket No. 61 at p. 6.) This argument fails because even if its logic were true (that a home in which someone can regularly be found is likely her residence), there is no evidence that the officers had a basis for believing that Hernandez could regularly be found at Apartment 191. The only evidence was a victim’s statement that he “could be found” at Apartment 191 and at another location. Knowledge that a suspect “could be found” at a particular dwelling, without more, is not enough to provide a reasonable belief that the suspect resides at the dwelling. And here, there was nothing more. Officer Vazquez testified that he had no other basis for believing that Hernandez resided at Apartment 191 other than the victim’s statement that Hernandez could be found at Apartment 191. (Docket No. 63 at p. 62.) Furthermore, no testimony made clear that officer Vazquez or any other officer even subjectively believed that Apartment 191 was Hernandez’s residence.

The Court overrules the United States’ first objection and ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s legal reasoning and conclusion that the arrest warrant did not give the officers authority to enter Apartment 191.