When the subject of of an arrest warrant is in a third party’s house, Payton governs the entry as to him and Stegald as to the resident. This entry satisfied Payton, and the suppression order is reversed. United States v. Bohannon, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9789 (2d Cir. May 31, 2016):
On appeal from a suppression order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Hall, C.J.), we consider whether defendant, apprehended pursuant to a valid arrest warrant in a third party’s residence entered without search-warrant authorization, is entitled to have any evidence seized incident to arrest excluded from trial as the fruit of an unlawful entry. Like the district court and eight of our sister circuits, we here conclude that, whether the subject of an arrest warrant is apprehended in his own home or a third party’s residence where he is a guest, his Fourth Amendment privacy rights with respect to entry are those stated in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980), i.e., at the time of entry, arresting officers must possess (a) a valid arrest warrant for the subject and (b) reason to believe that the subject is then in the premises. In such circumstances, the third party’s Fourth Amendment right to have a search warrant authorize entry into his home, see Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1981), does not extend to the subject of the arrest warrant. Where we depart from the district court, however, is in here concluding that the totality of circumstances established that, at the time of entry, law enforcement officers possessed the requisite reason to believe that defendant was then present in the third party’s residence.
. . .
C. Payton, Not Steagald, Delineates the Fourth Amendment Rights of an Arrest-Warrant Subject Apprehended in a Third-Party Residence Where He Is a Visitor
The government does not—and cannot—dispute that entry into Shonsai Dickson’s home without a search warrant was unlawful as to her in light of Steagald. But it is not the third-party resident, Dickson, who is before us in this case. Rather, it is Bohannon, the subject of the arrest warrant executed in Dickson’s home, who invokes Steagald to argue that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because Dickson’s home was entered without a search warrant. Steagald does not afford him such a claim. The Supreme Court there made clear that it was recognizing only the third-party resident’s right to a search warrant and expressly leaving open the question of “whether the subject of an arrest warrant can object to the absence of a search warrant when he is apprehended in another person’s home.” Id. at 219. Indeed, the question remains unanswered by the Supreme Court to this day.
After Payton—but prior to Steagald—this court held that “police may enter a dwelling to execute an arrest warrant for a person other than its owner or tenant where there exists reasonable belief that the party sought will be found therein.” United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have not considered the question, however, in the aftermath of Steagald. See United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 133 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that question remains open in this court).
In now answering that question, we begin by noting that eight of our sister circuits have concluded that the subject of an arrest warrant, apprehended in a third party’s residence, may not invoke Steagald to claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because entry into the residence was not authorized by a search warrant. See United States v. Hollis, 780 F.3d 1064, 1068-69 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 468 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Kern, 336 F. App’x 296, 297-98 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. McCarson, 527 F.3d 170, 172-73, 381 U.S. App. D.C. 219 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Kaylor, 877 F.2d 658, 663 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
The rationale for this conclusion, as we recognized in Snype, is that “(a) Fourth Amendment rights are personal and cannot be asserted vicariously, and (b) requiring police who already hold an arrest warrant for a suspect to obtain a search warrant before they can pursue that suspect in a third party’s home would grant the suspect broader rights in the third party’s home than he would have in his own home under Payton.” 441 F.3d at 133 (collecting cases to date); see United States v. Hollis, 780 F.3d at 1068 (stating that “‘person has no greater right of privacy in another’s home than in his own,'” and, therefore, “‘[i]f an arrest warrant and reason to believe the person named in the warrant is present are sufficient to protect that person’s [F]ourth [A]mendment privacy rights in his own home, they necessarily suffice to protect his privacy rights in the home of another'” (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d at 197)); United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d at 468 (observing that “Steagald did not hold that the subject of an arrest warrant has a higher expectation of privacy in another person’s residence than he does in his own”); United States v. Kern, 336 F. App’x at 298 (rejecting defendant’s complaint that entry into premises to effect his arrest violated third-party homeowner’s right to be free from unreasonable search because “‘Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which … may not be vicariously asserted'” (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978))); United States v. McCarson, 527 F.3d at 172-73 (holding that subject of arrest warrant apprehended in another’s home lacks standing to invoke homeowner’s Steagald rights “in his defense”); United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 482 (stating that it would be “illogical” to extend to subject of arrest warrant “greater rights of privacy in the … home of his girlfriend than he would have been afforded in his residence of record under Payton”); see also 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (“LaFave, Search and Seizure”) § 11.3(b), at 202 & nn.134-35 (5th ed. 2012).
We here adopt this reasoning as our own and join our sister circuits in concluding that the subject of a valid arrest warrant cannot complain that his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure was violated by apprehension in a third party’s home, entry to which was not authorized by a search warrant. The arrest-warrant subject has no greater privacy rights in such circumstances than he would have had if the arrest had been made in his own home. Thus, if, at the time of entry, law enforcement officers possessed a valid warrant for the subject’s arrest and reason to believe that he was then in the premises entered, the subject of the arrest warrant will not be heard to complain that entry was not authorized by a search warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 602-03.
