CA11: Handling a key fob during a consent search for drugs was not unreasonable because there was RS

The person who rented the motel room for defendant and another still had the key and equal access to the room to consent to its search. In a consent search of the room for drugs in a suspected drug dealing operation, the police handled a key fob where defendant said she didn’t have a car there. Assuming handling the key fob was a search, the court finds that handling it was beyond the scope of consent but otherwise reasonable because there was reasonable suspicion that there was, in fact, another car there. United States v. Dasinger, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9486 (11th Cir. May 24, 2016):

Under the totality of circumstances, Hartzig’s manipulation of the keys and key fob was not an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. To the extent Dasinger had a privacy interest in the identity of the car, this interest was outweighed by the officers’ legitimate interest in investigating the signs of criminal activity. Before Hartzig briefly held the keys and pressed the key fob, he knew that drugs had been found in Lloyd’s car and in both motel rooms. He also had found scales and plastic bags, signs of drug distribution, but not the amount of drugs one would expect if drug sales were taking place. Dasinger had also told him that the only items belonging to her were in a plastic bag on the floor and that she had no vehicle on the premises. This statement seemed suspicious given the presence of two sets of car keys on the nightstand, but Hartzig’s suspicion was further aroused when Dasinger claimed that the keys were hers but insisted nonetheless that the car was not on site. In the light of the inconsistency and evidence that a drug operation was afoot, and in particular that drugs had been found in Lloyd’s car, Hartzig’s minimal intrusion into Dasinger’s privacy—holding her keys a few seconds and clicking the key fob to test the accuracy of Dasinger’s story—did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Dasinger’s motion to suppress.