GA: Search warrants are for things and places and things can move

Search warrant for package received at a mail drop was properly executed even though the package had been moved to defendant’s car. Search warrants are for things and places, and things move. Ferguson v. State, 292 Ga. App. 7, 663 S.E.2d 760 (2008):

“[S]earch warrants are not directed at persons; they authorize the search of ‘places’ and the seizure of ‘things,’ and as a constitutional matter they need not even name the person from whom the things will be seized.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Scott v. State, 213 Ga. App. 84, 86 (1) (444 SE2d 96) (1994). “If a search warrant, read as a whole, points out the premises, person or property to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to them, it meets the description requirement.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Minter v. State, 206 Ga. App. 692, 693 (1) (426 SE2d 169) (1992). The police obtained a search warrant for a particular package “located at 4002 Stone Mountain Highway (U.S. 78), Suite 530, Snellville, Gwinnett County, Georgia.” The supporting affidavit described the package, including its specific tracking number. The package was located at that address and was seized at that address, although Ferguson was at the point of departing with the package in his vehicle at the time officers seized it.

Police officer’s involvement with police made juvenile’s interview at school subject to Miranda. In the Interest of T.A.G., 292 Ga. App. 48, 663 S.E.2d 392 (2008).*

Defendant’s nervousness during stop was caused by the officer’s manner of questioning. Cuaresma v. State, 292 Ga. App. 43, 663 S.E.2d 396 (2008):

Crumbley and Cuaresma next contend that their detention exceeded permissible limits and that they did not give valid consent to search the truck. The officer testified that Crumbley seemed nervous and that his answers were evasive. However, the officer’s manner of questioning from the outset of the stop would have made anyone nervous. Moreover, at this point, the officer’s only knowledge of criminal wrongdoing was that the truck had made an illegal lane change. A police officer who stops a motorist for a routine traffic violation is not permitted to expand the detention into a fishing expedition for evidence of unrelated offenses.

. . .

Here, the videotape speaks for itself. It vividly shows that the officers used intimidation, harassment, and threats of arrest to convince Crumbley to consent to the search. Crumbley’s so-called consent, at best, was merely an “acquiescence to authority” since the officers essentially told Crumbley that the truck would be searched regardless of his consent. It is obvious from the videotape and the officer’s testimony at the motion to suppress hearing that the officers had no particularized, objective basis for suspecting Crumbley of criminal activity, yet the officers decided to conduct a drug investigation rather than ticket Crumbley and release him. The consent in this case was coerced and thus invalid. The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress.