Corroboration of statements against penal interest saved warrant where no showing of basis of knowledge

Affidavit for search warrant did not show the informant’s basis of knowledge, but the affidavit related statements against penal interest and the officer corroborated significant details. Thus, the officer showed probable cause. United States v. Evans, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34285 (D. Vt. April 23, 2008).*

Outstanding traffic warrant justified limited entry and protective sweep when the person wanted answered the door. When defendant answered the door, he was inside, and the kitchen was right next to him, so the officers could conduct a protective sweep of the kitchen and plain view supported seizure of drugs on the kitchen counter. United States v. Williams, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34278 (W.D. La. February 5, 2008)*:

In this case, the officers knew of an outstanding traffic warrant for the defendant. The defendant does not challenge the existence or validity of the warrant. In addition, the officers had several reasons to believe the defendant was home. First, they had identified the pickup truck parked outside as one the defendant drove. Second, when the officers knocked on the front door, Williams opened the door. Baugh immediately recognized Williams, having previously viewed a photograph of him. Since the officers had an arrest warrant and reason to believe that Williams was home, they had the authority to enter into the home to arrest him.

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Each of these cases — Charles, Thomas, and Mayo — supports the holding that the kitchen in this case constituted an immediately adjoining space under Buie. In this case, the defendant was arrested in the doorway of his house, with the majority of his body inside the house. The kitchen immediately adjoins the area just inside the front door. Furthermore, a wall that extends five feet from the front of the house toward the back made it impossible for the officers to see a portion of the kitchen. In the portion of the kitchen not visible, there was adequate space from which another individual could launch an attack. By taking just a few steps, Baugh or Kent could see around the corner and ensure their safety. This distance is comparable to that covered by the officers in Charles and Mayo, and significantly less than that covered by the officer in Thomas. As a result, the officers could look into the kitchen for other persons, even if they did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion.

Two hour delay for processing at the Laredo border crossing was not unreasonable. Defendant’s story was that he was in Mexico for two weeks visiting with a child, and the Customs officers thought the car seemed unusually clean for a two week trip with a child. The car was subjected to a mobile x-ray inspection, and then directed to the side for a further more intense search that produced drugs hidden in the dash. United States v. Cervantez-Valerio, 275 Fed. Appx. 417 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished)*:

Cervantez’ contention that the search of his vehicle became unreasonable merely because the Officers searched unsuccessfully for contraband for roughly two hours fails. As Flores-Montano makes clear, the Fourth Amendment does not shield individuals from “inconvenience or delay at the international border”. Id. at 155. n.3 (“We think it clear that delays of one to two hours at international borders are to be expected.”).

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Cervantez also maintains the Government impermissibly used a probe to determine there was cocaine behind his dashboard, claiming the Officers had no reasonable suspicion to believe they would uncover contraband. This claim, however, is similarly disposed of by Flores-Montano.