ID: Officer stalled the stop to give drug dog time to arrive without RS

Defendant argued that his motion to suppress should have been granted because the officer slow walked the stop for 19 minutes without reasonable suspicion to give time for the drug dog to arrive. The trial court’s findings were not helpful in divining the outcome, but the court of appeals acknowledges the trial court didn’t have the benefit of Rodriguez. Defendant made his record, the continuation of the stop for the drug dog was without reasonable suspicion, and the motion to suppress should be granted. State v. Linze, 2016 Ida. App. LEXIS 5 (Jan. 8, 2016):

The first question is whether the officer prolonged the stop by delaying writing the citation in order for the canine unit to arrive. In this case, the officer took over nineteen minutes to check the driver’s and Linze’s identifications and write a citation–nine minutes before the canine unit was requested and an additional ten minutes after the canine unit was requested until it arrived. It is unclear what, specifically, the officer was doing during the ten-minute period before the canine officer arrived. However, when asked why it took nineteen minutes, the officer testified that, “I was thorough. On my warrant checks I ran both through the computer. And my handwriting is very sloppy, so I take my time when I write my tickets.” The district court found that “there was no evidence that [the initial officer] unlawfully delayed [Linze] or extended the duration of the stop any longer than was reasonable.” There was no finding by the district court indicating what amount of time is reasonable to conduct a stop and issue a citation for a cracked windshield. Accordingly, there is room to question the district court’s conclusion regarding whether nineteen minutes was a reasonable amount of time in this case. However, even assuming the nineteen minutes was reasonable and the officer did not unreasonably prolong writing the citation to allow time for a canine unit to arrive, it is uncontested that the officer provided cover for the canine officer in order to protect the canine officer’s safety during the canine sweep.

The second question is whether the officer prolonged the stop by assisting in the canine sweep of the vehicle. When the canine officer arrived, the initial officer stepped out of his patrol car and explained the reason the vehicle was stopped and the reason the initial officer called for a canine unit. The canine officer then spoke with the driver and Linze before initiating the canine sweep. The initial officer testified that, while the canine officer conducted the canine sweep, the initial officer stayed outside of his vehicle and provided “officer cover.” The initial officer explained that the canine officer was unable to watch his surroundings while conducting the canine sweep and, therefore, the initial officer believed it was necessary to watch and make sure nobody tried to harm the canine officer. Approximately thirty seconds after the sweep began, the canine alerted on the vehicle, indicating the presence of drugs in the vehicle. It is undisputed that over two minutes elapsed from the time the canine officer arrived and when the canine alerted on the vehicle.

The district court did not address when the citation for a cracked windshield should have reasonably been issued or whether the initial officer’s providing officer cover unconstitutionally prolonged the stop. The district court is not at fault for failing to make these findings because it did not have the benefit of Rodriguez. Although the district court did not make specific findings, it is clear from the record that the initial officer was not moving forward with the purpose of the stop–issuing a citation for a cracked windshield–for approximately two and a half minutes. Instead, he was assisting with a canine sweep. The Supreme Court in Rodriguez held that the central question regarding canine sweeps is whether the sniff prolongs or adds time to the stop. In light of Rodriguez, we hold that the initial officer’s participation in the canine sweep added approximately two and a half minutes to the stop, resulting in an unlawful extension of Linze’s detention. Further, there was not reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigation for drug-related offenses, justifying the extension of Linze’s detention. Thus, the district court erred in denying Linze’s motion to suppress evidence obtained through the unlawful canine sweep.

Linze also argues that the district court erred in finding that the drug dog’s alert gave the officers probable cause to search the interior of the vehicle without a search warrant. It is well settled that, when a reliable drug dog indicates that a lawfully stopped automobile contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer has probable cause to believe that there are drugs in the automobile and may search it without a warrant. State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 843, 979 P.2d 1199, 1201 (1999); State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 281, 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 2005). However, Linze asserts that, in his case, the drug dog’s alert did not provide probable cause because that particular drug dog was unreliable. Because the canine sweep itself was unconstitutional, we need not address whether the canine’s alert provided reasonable suspicion.

In light of Rodriguez, the district court erred in denying Linze’s motion to suppress because the canine sweep violated Linze’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Because the sweep was unconstitutional, we need not address whether the canine’s alert provided reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Linze’s motion to suppress, and we vacate Linze’s judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine.