On de novo review of the district court’s finding of reasonable suspicion, the court of appeals finds it completely lacking. The four factors individually and collectively (Arvizu) provides no reasonable suspicion. United States v. Williams, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21560 (4th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015):
We thus turn to the dispositive issue in this appeal: whether, on this record, Deputies Russell and Soles had the reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to extend the traffic stop and conduct the dog sniff of the Hyundai. The district court, for its part, acknowledged that reasonable suspicion “must rest” on four factors:
• The Defendants were traveling “in a rental car”;
• The Defendants were traveling “on a known drug corridor at 12:37 a.m.”;
• “Williams’ stated travel plans were inconsistent with, and would likely exceed, the due date for return of the rental car”; and
• “Williams was unable to provide a permanent home address in New York even though he claimed to live there at least part-time and had a New York driver’s license.”See Superseding Opinion 31. We evaluate those factors both separately and in the aggregate, recognizing that our inquiry must account for the “totality of the circumstances,” rather than employ a “divide-and-conquer analysis.” See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274.
1.
a.
The first factor identified in the Superseding Opinion — the Defendants’ use of a rental car — is of minimal value to the reasonable-suspicion evaluation. Neither Deputy Russell nor Deputy Soles explained any connection between use of a rental car and criminal activity. We will nevertheless accept that, as a general proposition, some drug traffickers use rental cars. … It is similarly beyond peradventure, however, that the overwhelming majority of rental car drivers on our nation’s highways are innocent travelers with entirely legitimate purposes.b.
The second factor relied on in the Superseding Opinion — that the Defendants were traveling “on a known drug corridor at 12:37 a.m.” — is the only factor that, on its face, makes any reference to criminal activity. Similar to traveling in a rental car, however, the number of persons using the interstate highways as drug corridors pales in comparison to the number of innocent travelers on those roads. Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the proposition that traveling south on I-85 late at night helps narrow the identification of travelers to those involved in drug activity.
. . .
There is simply no basis on this record for assigning some nefarious significance to the 12:37 a.m. time of the traffic stop. Neither Deputy Russell nor Deputy Soles asserted that drug traffickers have some disproportionate tendency to travel on the interstate highways late at night. Nor is there support for the proposition that nighttime travel — alone or in combination with other factors identified in the Superseding Opinion — is an indicator of drug trafficking.
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c.
. . .
We do not doubt that the third factor [return due on rental car], if it had been “keyed to other compelling suspicious behavior,” might contribute to an experienced officer’s reasonable suspicion. See Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 513. But no reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminality arises from the mere fact that Williams’s travel plans were likely to exceed the initial duration of the rental agreement.
. . .
d.
. . .
Despite the deputies’ failure to draw any suspicion from Williams’s post office box address, the district court hypothesized that the “different addresses and [the] explanations” Williams gave for them “may have legitimately raised suspicion.” See Superseding Opinion 22 (emphasis added). In connecting Williams’s use of a post office box address with possible suspicion, the court relied on our unpublished decision in United States v. Newland, 246 F. App’x 180 (4th Cir. 2007).
As with the second factor, cherry-picking “relevant factor” findings from inapposite factual contexts bears little fruit. …
. . .
Put succinctly, Deputies Russell and Soles failed to develop the fourth factor with Williams during the traffic stop and offered no explanation of how that factor contributed to any reasonable suspicion. Absent some factual underpinning, the significance of the fourth factor collapses.
. . .
Stated simply, the Superseding Opinion’s four factors — in the aggregate — fail to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers. Because the applicable standard requires such a showing, the government’s contention fails to pass constitutional muster.
