NC: Federal civil rights 12(b)(6) dismissal not “adjudication on the merits” for collateral estoppel in state court

Dismissal of a Fourth Amendment civil rights claim under the federal heightened pleading standard was not an “adjudication on the merits” for collateral estoppel in state court. Fox v. Johnson, 2015 N.C. App. LEXIS 814 (October 6, 2015):

Given the difference between the federal and State pleading standards, we must conclude that a federal court’s dismissal of claims pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) is not an adjudication on the merits for purposes of collaterally estopping a plaintiff from raising the same or related claims under State law in our State’s courts. See Hoots, 106 N.C. App. at 404, 417 S.E.2d at 274. In other words, a determination that Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding proximate cause in their Fourth Amendment claims did not pass the federal plausibility test does not automatically mean they fail to meet the notice pleading requirements of our State. We acknowledge that the federal court’s well-reasoned and highly detailed opinion amply demonstrates that the allegations in Plaintiffs’ federal complaint regarding proximate cause between Defendants’ alleged acts and Plaintiffs’ criminal prosecutions were, “to put it charitably, sparse at best.” Fox, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 495. However, the “issue actually litigated in the prior suit … and … actually determined” by the federal court, see Bluebird Corp., 188 N.C. App. at 678, 657 S.E.2d at 61 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), was whether Plaintiffs’ pleadings met the plausibility standard applicable to motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6). The federal court’s opinion simply did not consider or address the issue of whether Plaintiffs’ pleadings sufficiently stated a claim to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to the notice pleading requirements of North Carolina Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(c) based upon their assertion of collateral estoppel.

This entry was posted in § 1983 / Bivens. Bookmark the permalink.

Comments are closed.