Officers came to a house in a high crime area and rousted people coming out; they had reasonable suspicion as to defendant

Officers hung outside a house that the neighbors were complaining about because of crime and too many people congregating there. They encountered the defendant outside and asked for his identification, and he backed up. Defendant’s furtive movements gave reasonable suspicion for a patdown. State v. Green, 2008 Iowa App. LEXIS 170 (March 14, 2008):

Further, the officers here were aware this was a high-crime area because they had received many complaints from the neighbors regarding drug dealing activity, dog fighting, drinking, and general disorderly conduct. In addition to these general complaints, there had been approximately three calls where police actually had to go to the address in question on formal complaints. Although an “individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime”, “the fact that the stop occurred in a ‘high crime area’ [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, we conclude that based on Green’s furtive movements, the officer’s experience and knowledge that the area in question was a high-crime area, and all other surrounding circumstances, Officer McGeough had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that his safety or that of others was in danger. He thus was warranted in proceeding with a Terry protective weapons pat-down of Green at that point in time.

During the pat-down, Officer McGeough felt a bulge in the back pocket Green had been reaching toward repeatedly. Upon lifting the tail of Green’s shirt to look at the bulge McGeough saw a plastic baggie sticking out of Green’s pocket. Based on his training and experience, as well as all of the other surrounding circumstances, McGeough believed that type of baggie likely contained narcotics. Accordingly, McGeough had probable cause to remove the baggie from Green’s pocket because he believed it to contain contraband. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334, 340 (1993) (holding an officer may conduct a protective weapons search or pat-down of a suspect’s outer clothing and may seize an object if its incriminating nature is immediately apparent through size or shape); State v. Harriman, 737 N.W.2d 318, 320-21 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007) (finding that because officer was immediately certain item was contraband without manipulating it the item was properly discovered under “plain-feel” exception to warrant requirement). Upon confirming the contents of the baggie McGeough had probable cause to arrest Green on suspicion of drug possession. McGeough then arrested Green, placed him in handcuffs, read him his Miranda rights, and put him in the squad car. For purposes of this appeal we conclude Green was in custody from the point when he was arrested and handcuffed by Officer McGeough.

Just because the officer could not see defendant’s license plate at 100′ did not mean that he could not see it at 50′, and the court would not make that assumption. The stop was invalid. State v. Reisetter, 747 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa App. 2008).*

Defendant’s lane changes justified his stop. State v. Mann, 2008 Iowa App. LEXIS 143 (March 14, 2008).