NC: SW for a house did not authorize search of a car of a visitor in the driveway [Reversed 12/21/16]

Officers with a search warrant for a house could not search a car of a visitor in the driveway under the warrant. State v. Lowe, 2015 N.C. App. LEXIS 633 (July 21, 2015). Update: Reversed State v. Lowe, 2016 N.C. LEXIS 1116 (Dec. 21, 2016), rev’d State v. Lowe, 774 S.E.2d 893 (N.C. App. 2015) (posted here):

Here, it is undisputed that the Volkswagen parked in Turner’s driveway was within the curtilage of the residence that the officers were authorized to search pursuant to the warrant. Therefore, the State argues that the holdings of Courtright, Reid, and Logan require us to affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress. We are unpersuaded.

The crucial fact distinguishing this case from Courtright, Reid, and Logan relates to law enforcement officers’ knowledge about the ownership and control of the vehicle. In each of the cases relied on by the State, the individual associated with the premises identified in the search warrant unquestionably owned and operated the vehicle that was searched at that location. See Courtright, 60 N.C. App. at 249, 298 S.E.2d at 741 (1983) (noting that the officers had observed the vehicle at the defendant’s home and knew it was registered in the defendant’s name before searching it); Reid, 286 N.C. at 326-27, 210 S.E.2d at 424 (emphasizing “the wisdom of the cases which hold a search warrant for contraband on specifically described premises, contemplates the search of any automobile belonging to the owner and parked thereon”) (emphasis added); Logan, 27 N.C. App. at 151, 218 S.E.2d at 214 (characterizing the vehicle searched at the defendant’s premises as the “defendant’s automobile”).

Here, the target of the search was Turner. However, officers knew prior to searching the Volkswagen in the driveway that it did not belong to Turner. At the evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motions to suppress, Det. Barber testified that prior to the search, he had never seen the Volkswagen at Turner’s residence. He further testified that after the officers went into Turner’s home, they established that the vehicle was being rented by Ms. Doctors, operated by defendant and Ms. Doctors, and that Turner had neither dominion nor control over the vehicle.

These facts distinguish this case from Courtright, Reid, and Logan. The reasoning justifying the holdings of those opinions simply does not apply here. We note that our appellate courts have yet to determine the precise issue raised in this case—whether the search of a vehicle rented and operated by an overnight guest at a residence described in a search warrant may be validly searched under the scope of that warrant. However, we find guidance in the holdings from this Court addressing the constitutionality of searches of persons at the premises identified in a validly executed search warrant and from other jurisdictions addressing the dispositive issue before us.

The seminal case on the constitutionality of searching visitors at a location identified in a valid warrant is Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979). In Ybarra, police officers obtained a warrant supported by probable cause to search a tavern at which the defendant was a patron. Id. at 88, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 243. The defendant was searched pursuant to that warrant, and the officers found drugs in his pocket. Id. at 89, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 243.