Four states recognize the prohibitive collective knowledge. Texas does not. Even though some officers may know that reasonable suspicion has dissipated, the officer making the stop did not. O’Bryan v. State, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 5406 (Tex. App. – Ft. Worth May 28, 2015):
O’Bryan asserts that when assessing whether the detention of O’Bryan was supported by reasonable suspicion we must consider the “collective knowledge” of all law enforcement authorities at the time the stop occurred, including police knowledge that the vehicle had been recovered and returned to its owner prior to the stop. As will be discussed below, theoretically the collective knowledge doctrine could be applied either permissively or prohibitively. In this case, O’Bryan seeks a prohibitive application of the doctrine.
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While four states [California, Maryland, New York, and Washington] have extended the collective knowledge doctrine to apply prohibitively, Texas is not one of them.
Whether as a repository for collective knowledge or as an historically trustworthy source of information, NCIC—and its records—has received widespread acceptance as providing a sufficient basis for both probable cause and reasonable suspicion. See Delk v. State, 855 S.W.2d 700, 711 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 982 (1993) (holding that information obtained from the NCIC system provides an investigating officer with reasonable suspicion to detain a driver and conduct further investigation); Stevens v. State, 667 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (holding that the NCIC stolen-vehicle return provided independent probable cause to arrest appellant for theft of the automobile); see also Williams v. State, No. 14-08-00268-CR, 2009 WL 3643513, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 5, 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that NCIC provided reasonable suspicion to stop appellant who was driving a vehicle that was reported stolen); Nevels v. State, No. 14-13-00497-CR, 2004 WL 769804, at *2 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 13, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that an NCIC report that a car was stolen is sufficient to support probable cause); Nunnally v. State, No. 11-03-00237-CR, 2004 WL 292051, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 12, 2004, pet. ref’d) (opinion, not designated for publication) (noting that the officer had probable cause to arrest the appellant based on computer information he received); Givens v. State, 949 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, pet. ref’d) (recognizing that the officer’s reliance on NCIC provided probable cause for the arrest).
And while no Texas courts have directly addressed the prohibitive application of the collective knowledge doctrine when considering reasonable suspicion or probable cause, in considering NCIC information as a basis for probable cause and reasonable suspicion, they have addressed the possibility of error and its effect on these burdens. See Brown v. State, 986 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, no pet.) (holding that “it is not necessary for the NCIC database of stolen vehicles to be accurate on every occasion for an NCIC hit to establish probable cause,” and an officer may rely on the information even if it is later proved to be erroneous); see also Thornton v. State, No. 10-12-00431-CR, 2014 WL 813745, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 27, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding actual ownership of a vehicle was not relevant to the detention of the appellant because the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant based on NCIC information, even if it was later proven to be incorrect), Cardiel v. State, No. 03-11-00220-CR, 2012 WL 2077908, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin, June 7, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (explaining that even though appellant’s stop was based on a stolen vehicle report that turned out to be incorrect, the fact the report was mistaken did not render the stop or arrest invalid); Mount v. State, 217 S.W.3d 716, 728 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (“An investigatory detention or an arrest is not invalid merely because an officer relies upon reasonably trustworthy information that later proves to be erroneous.”); Givens, 949 S.W.2d at 451 (holding that extrinsic proof of NCIC accuracy is not required to overcome a motion to suppress).
In Brown v. State, the Fifth Court of Appeals states that
[I]t is well established an arrest is not invalid merely because an officer relies on reasonably trustworthy information which later proves to be erroneous. Therefore, it is not necessary for the NCIC database of stolen vehicles to be accurate on every occasion for an NCIC hit to establish probable cause. On the basis of the current record, we have no reason to question whether stolen vehicle information obtained from the NCIC is reasonably trustworthy. Accordingly, we conclude the NCIC information available to the officers here established probable cause for the warrantless arrest.
986 S.W.2d at 53-54 (internal citations omitted).
For the reasons stated above, we hold that the NCIC report was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion and therefore conclude that O’Bryan’s constitutional rights were not violated by his warrantless arrest. We overrule his first issue.
