“Whatever view one has of the Fourth Amendment, its exceptional graces surely must be preserved from too casual invocation.” Here, the officers had probable cause, but no arrest or search warrant, when they entered a motel room looking for defendant for a robbery of a convenience store. He also stole lottery tickets, and they were promptly reported, and the police were led to the stores where they were attempted to be cashed because the lottery computer immediately flagged them as taken in a robbery, leading to detention of a co-conspirator who gave the defendant up. The inevitable discovery rule fails on these facts, too. Just because the police have probable cause, they must make some effort toward getting a warrant and can’t just blow it off. Otherwise, “To accept probable cause alone is to probably cause the (inevitable discovery) exception to swallow the (warrant requirement) rule.” United States v. Harris, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46336 (D.Kan. April 9, 2015):
Whatever view one has of the Fourth Amendment, its exceptional graces surely must be preserved from too casual invocation. “With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no.” “This presumption applies not just to homes but also to temporary residences like motel rooms.” Here, the officers made no effort to obtain a warrant to search Harris’ room. Absent a warrant, the officers’ conduct was presumptively unreasonable. Absent an exception, the evidence must be suppressed. If the Fourth Amendment is going to save the officers’ conduct, then the Government must shoulder its “especially heavy” burden to prove the exceptional circumstances that it claims. The Court therefore considers whether the events surrounding the officers’ searches evidence the extraordinary circumstances necessary to disregard the Fourth Amendment’s command that a valid warrant generally precede every entry into the home.
. . .
Two facts jointly convinced Officer Strathman that safety concerns made warrantless entry imperative. First, based on H.B.’s prior 911 call, he worried that Harris might harm H.B. for speaking with law enforcement. Second, he believed that Harris recently committed an armed robbery and might still be armed. When questioned at room 24’s threshold about officers’ authority to enter, however, Officer Strathman’s only response was that Harris committed a felony. He did not specify any safety concern.
The Court is unable to identify from these facts any imminent danger that a prudent, well-trained officer would consider compelling enough to perform a warrantless sweep of Harris’ motel room. The mere fact that a suspect is wanted for a felony does not create an exigency that authorizes officers to search that suspect’s residence without a warrant. Additionally, no evidence demonstrates the likelihood that harm would befall H.B. absent immediate entry. Though H.B.’s 911 call troubled Officer Strathman, the facts do not substantiate his concern. No evidence indicates that Harris actually harmed or threatened to harm H.B. during their prior encounter at C.B.’s home. Even accepting Officer Strathman’s concern, officers were not responding to an emergency call from the Country Club Motel. They approached room 24 with no knowledge that someone inside needed aid. The evidence indicates that Harris was the only potential occupant of room 24. Absent additional facts, a well-trained officer would not imagine that Harris would-even could-cause immediate harm to H.B. (or the public) from his motel room.
Room 24’s condition only further undermines the Government’s claim of exigency. Officers approached a lightless, silent room. They surrounded the only entrance. Even after numerous attempts to provoke a response from room 24, conditions remained static. Without knowledge that the room concealed a particular endangered party or a particular ongoing activity that threatened imminent harm to others,21a prudent, well-trained officer would have delayed entry.
Alternatively, the sweep exceeded the scope necessary to address the perceived risks. Even if the Court disregarded precedent and agreed that Officer Strathman’s two safety concerns qualified as exigent, officers could have resolved these concerns without warrantless entry. They easily could have posted officers at the door to secure the only entrance to room 24. Not only would this tactic have ensured that, if present, Harris did not escape to cause harm to H.B. or others, but it would have afforded officers ample time to pursue a search warrant. Instead, the officers searched first and secured second. Because the officers overestimated the necessity of immediate intervention and overreacted to the present danger, the Government fails to overcome the presumption that their initial sweep was unreasonable and hence unconstitutional.
. . .
On final assessment, the weight of these factors advises against making an exception for officers’ conduct toward Harris. Officers jumped the gun, but not to accomplish a search for which they believed that they lacked probable cause. Indeed, the strength of probable cause certainly encourages the likelihood that evidence could have been discovered. But the lack of any effort, at any time, to obtain a warrant more forcefully discourages the likelihood that evidence would have been discovered. “[W]hat makes a discovery ‘inevitable’ is not probable cause alone … but probable cause plus a chain of events that would have led to a warrant … independent of the search.” The Government has proven more probable than not the strength of one link, but not the chain. Accordingly, the Court lacks the “high level of confidence” required to say: “there is no doubt that the police” ultimately or inevitably would have discovered the evidence by lawful means.
To conclude, the Government argues as follows. Officers had probable cause. Although officers did not use this probable cause to apply for a warrant as required, they could have. And if they had applied, they probably would have received a warrant that led to discovering the seized evidence. So, in this case, the Court might as well retroactively validate their conduct and admit the evidence. The Court, however, cannot distinguish this case from every case where an officer can demonstrate probable cause. To accept probable cause alone is to probably cause the (inevitable discovery) exception to swallow the (warrant requirement) rule. (footnotes omitted)
