A knock-and-announce violation is clearly established law, so no qualified immunity. But here, without an emotional distress claim, it’s only worth nominal damages, so the damages should be remitted. Here, there was a death of another, but plaintiff waived any damages related to that. Kane v. Lewis, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3990 (4th Cir. March 13, 2015):
We turn now to the Officers’ primary argument on appeal — that the district court erred by failing to remit the jury’s damages award in favor of Kane on the knock-and-announce claim to nominal damages. For the reasons that follow, we agree.
The Officers argue that, in finding in the Officers’ favor on the excessive force claim, the jury determined that Detective Lewis shot Cornish in self-defense, and therefore “necessarily concluded that Cornish realized and appreciated that the Officers were police officers prior to advancing upon [Detective] Lewis with a knife.” Appellants’ Br. at 33-34. They therefore contend that “Cornish’s undisputed [conduct] in attacking [Detective] Lewis” was the “superseding cause of his death,” id. at 39 — and that there was no evidence that would have allowed the jury reasonably to conclude otherwise.
Kane responds, and the second district court agreed, that “[t]he jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that in the absence of a knock and announcement … it was reasonably foreseeable that a surprised Cornish may rush to the front door and take action in supposed self-defense and that a police officer may view that action as threatening and shoot and kill him.” Appellee’s Br. at 33. This view, however, does not accurately reflect either the applicable law or the facts of record.
Damages awarded under § 1983 for violations of constitutional rights are ordinarily governed by common law tort principles. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1986). “[T]he basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights ….” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978) (emphasis added). A plaintiff asserting a constitutional tort under § 1983 must therefore satisfy the familiar element of proximate causation. See Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 290 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Section 1983 … require[s] a showing of proximate causation, which is evaluated under the common law standard.”); see also Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 800 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he causal link in § 1983 cases is analogous to proximate cause.”). Section 1983 tort defendants are certainly “responsible for the natural consequences of [their] actions.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 n.7 (1986) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)) (internal quotation mark omitted). However, “[a] superseding cause [will] break[] the chain of proximate causation.” Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Warner v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1071 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that “in cases brought under § 1983 a superseding cause, as traditionally understood in common law tort doctrine, will relieve a defendant of liability”). Specifically, the “subsequent acts of independent decision-makers … may constitute intervening superseding causes that break the causal chain” and insulate police officers from § 1983 liability. Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012).
In similar circumstances, the Third Circuit has held that officers are liable only for “the harm ‘proximately’ or ‘legally’ caused by [their illegal entry]” and not “for all of the harm caused in the ‘philosophic’ or but-for sense by the illegal entry.” Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 1995) (Alito, J.). As such, officers who have unlawfully entered a home are not liable for “harm produced by a ‘superseding cause’” or the harm caused by the officers’ “non-tortious, as opposed to … tortious, ‘conduct,’ such as the use of reasonable force.” Id. The Bodine court illustrated its view with a hypothetical similar to the facts before us: if officers improperly entered a suspect’s house without knocking and announcing their presence but — once the officers were inside and had identified themselves — the suspect broke away and killed two of the officers, a third officer would not “necessarily [be] liable for the harm caused to the suspect [in attempting to disarm him] on the theory that the illegal entry without knocking and announcing rendered any subsequent use of force unlawful.” Id.
Other courts have also addressed § 1983 causation in similar circumstances and determined that a plaintiff’s conduct was the superseding cause of harm when it precipitated subsequent harm caused by an officer’s use of force. See James v. Chavez, 511 F. App’x 742, 750 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (concluding that, when a suspect was killed while attempting to stab a police officer, it was the suspect’s “unlawful and deliberate attack on the SWAT team [that] constitute[d] a superseding cause of his death”); Estate of Sowards v. City of Trenton, 125 F. App’x 31, 41 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (holding that the suspect’s “actions in threatening … officers with [a] handgun are what led to his injuries and death”).
Turning to the record, we conclude that no reasonable jury could have found that the Officers’ knock-and-announce violation proximately caused Cornish’s death. See Bodine, 72 F.3d at 400. The evidence Kane presented at trial was insufficient to establish that Cornish did not recognize that the men in his apartment were police officers, and therefore that the Officers’ illegal entry was the legal cause of Cornish’s death. Kane presented the testimony of Cornish’s roommate, Brad, who was not at home at the time of the search, and the expert testimony of Dr. John Adams, a physician and board certified pathologist. Brad testified that the door to the master bedroom, which was old and had to be lifted before it could be opened, was open when he left the apartment approximately two hours before the search. See J.A. 481-83. He also testified that a bicycle and a stereo were located in the area where Officer Shorter stumbled to the right of Cornish’s master bedroom door, J.A. 483; a crime scene photo indicated that neither item toppled during the confrontation. J.A. 205-06. Dr. Adams testified that he believed that Cornish moved “a foot or two … forward” in between the first and second shots before landing in the doorway between the living room and kitchen, and that he was unable to determine how fast Cornish was moving when he was shot. J.A. 688. Dr. Adams also testified that he could form only a “very incomplete” opinion as to Cornish’s position at the time of each shot, J.A. 684, and that he could not definitely conclude whether Cornish was holding a sheathed knife in his hand at the time of the first shot, although the knife was found under his body. J.A. 697. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Kane’s favor, this evidence reveals nothing about Cornish’s state of mind as he advanced on the Officers or his opportunity to recognize them as police. Accordingly, Kane’s evidence is insufficient to establish that Cornish’s death was “the natural consequence[] of [the Officers’] actions.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 344 n.7.
Moreover, the undisputed evidence establishes that Cornish must have recognized that the men in his apartment were police officers. It is undisputed that Cornish was found in the doorway between the living room and the kitchen. To reach that point, he had to travel more than 16 feet across an illuminated living room toward an illuminated kitchen in the direction of two police officers in SWAT gear who were shouting their identity. On these facts, as the first district court aptly recognized, Cornish “must have known that the men in his apartment were police officers but advanced on them nonetheless, and … no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.” J.A. 79.
Unfortunately for Kane, the strategic decision to abandon his claim for damages for emotional distress Cornish suffered during the period of time between the Officers’ entry and Cornish’s death constrains him here. Kane is no longer able to pursue recovery for that critical interval, which the claim itself recognizes existed. Had those claims been presented to the jury, it would have been easier for us to find an evidentiary basis for a monetary award other than nominal damages.
Because Cornish must have known that the men were police officers, yet advanced toward them with a knife, his “unlawful and deliberate attack on the [police] constitute[d] a superseding cause of his death.” James, 511 F. App’x at 750. In other words, the Officers’ illegal entry was not the legal cause of Cornish’s death; rather, he was “killed as a direct result of trying to stab a police officer.” Id. Accordingly, Kane is entitled only to nominal damages to vindicate the deprivation of Cornish’s constitutional rights on the knock-and-announce claim.
