Defendant’s backyard party at 4 a.m. did not show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the backyard

Defendant’s 4 a.m. party in the backyard did not show he had an expectation of privacy from police responding to a noise call and entering the backyard. State v. Dunn, 2007 MT 296, 340 Mont. 31, 172 P.3d 110 (2007):

[*P14] Here, Dunn did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is objectively willing to accept. First, we consider Dunn’s use of the property at the time of the intrusion. When police arrived at 4:00 a.m., Dunn, with a group of approximately seven people, was blaring music in the backyard from a car stereo. The party was boisterous enough to cause a neighbor to call in a complaint. Pursuant to § 45-8-101(1)(b), MCA, Dunn was effectively engaged in disorderly conduct by “making loud or unusual noises” that were disturbing the peace of the neighborhood. Because the music was still playing when the officers arrived, an ongoing crime was occurring in the officers’ presence. Second, an expectation of privacy must be objectively reasonable to society. We find it improbable that society is willing to accept a privacy expectation as “reasonable” where the individual uses his property to disturb the peace of others at 4:00 a.m. in the morning. Dunn was not conducting himself in a “private” manner, but rather, to the contrary, his imposition upon other residents was a very public act. Given these circumstances, we find that Dunn did not have an expectation of privacy in his backyard at the time police arrived to investigate.

A police officer’s telephone call to headquarters concerning his employment status and whether he would stay off on a work related injury was tape recorded, and he had a reasonable expectation that his calls would not be recorded because there was no beep on the line. Precedent established a reasonable expectation of privacy for calls to and from a public agency where there was explicit direction as to which lines were recorded and which were not. (This was combined with a First Amendment retaliation claim.) Diana v. Oliphant, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83834 (M.D. Pa. November 13, 2007).

Plaintiff improperly gave notice to local government under the Maryland Tort Claims Act, but his allegations of gross negligence or recklessness against the officer for shooting him without cause survives. Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 935 A.2d 699 (2007).*

In a legal malpractice case for plaintiff’s counsel not properly handling an excessive force claim, plaintiff would have been able to show that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity and that he had a submissible case for excessive force. The case was reversed for a redetermination of damages, however. Austin v. Sneed, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 688 (November 13, 2007).*

Minnesota also upholds DNA testing of convicts. State v. Jackson, 741 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. App. 2007).*