AZ: Any additional delay from asking for consent during a traffic stop is de minimus

Arizona holds that any additional delay after issuing defendant two warnings and defendant was [purportedly] free to go, when consent was sought, was de minimus by constitutional standards. Waiting 100 minutes for a drug dog to arrive was not unreasonable because it was based on reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking. State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 170 P.3d 266, 516 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 18 (2007), rev. den. 2008 Ariz. LEXIS 42 (Mar. 18, 2008):

P28 At the time of this incident, Officer Greene had approximately four years experience in law enforcement and had attended numerous schools in addition to basic academy training, including three drug interdiction schools. Based on his specialized training and experience, the officer testified that the following indicators present at this traffic stop were, in combination with one another, consistent with the trafficking of illegal drugs or other criminal activity: (1) the nature of defendant’s travel plans, namely, that he traveled from Florida to Phoenix in only two to three days, unusually fast for someone on vacation, and that his stated purpose for driving from Florida to Las Vegas was to play pool in a bar, yet he had no specific plans or hotel reservations; (2) the mounted cellular phones, indicating both were in use; (3) the fast-food wrappers and containers of food; (4) the luggage and clothing hung in the backseat rather than the trunk; (5) defendant’s response during the first stop that he was not “aware” of anyone placing contraband in his vehicle; (6) defendant’s decision to exit his vehicle and approach the patrol car during the second stop; and (7) the stop occurred in a known drug corridor.

Under State v. Gant, 216 Ariz. 1, 162 P.3d 640 (2007), defendant was arrested too far away from his car to make it subject to search incident. However, the state wins this case based on the fact that inevitable discovery would save the search because of application of the inventory doctrine, a challenge not made below. State v. Rojers, 216 Ariz. 555, 169 P.3d 651 (2007). Comment: The court faults the defendant for not putting the trial court and the state on notice of this argument and then gleans from the record enough to show that it sort of was peripherally raised because the arguments sounded like an inventory issue. This is the perverse beauty of appellate review. In this case, the court could have just said “this wasn’t fully litigated below, so you lose,” but it chose to go into the merits without a full record to further nail the defendant by showing that “with what we have here, this search looks OK.” In this case, the defendant is faulted for not being more specific as to what he wanted to litigate because the tenor of the argument showed that he was on the right track. The bottom line is really more simple than the court allows, and it is visible to me between the lines: The defendant knew the argument and he raised it, but knew he could not win on the facts so he chose to not delve into it in detail. Been there; done that; have the lost suppression motions to prove it.

Defendant obviously felt pressure to consent, but it was [apparently] of his own making, and that did not make consent invalid. Defendant seized on one sentence in the USMJ’s R&R. United States v. Tindell, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80418 (E.D. Tenn. October 30, 2007):

Viewed in its complete context, Judge Guyton’s statement means nothing more than Tindell probably felt pressure under the circumstances based on his outstanding warrant or based on the fact that the KPD officers appeared to have considerable information about his drug dealing. The key point in all of this, however, is that Judge Guyton ultimately concluded that police coercion did not contribute to defendant’s statements and admissions. Judge Guyton correctly concluded in effect that the totality of the circumstances indicates that any statement by Tindell was the product of free and rational choice rather than any police coercion. There is ample case law supporting Judge Guyton’s conclusion that the situation in this case falls far short of the police coercion required to render a defendant’s statement involuntary. …

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