E.D.La.: No constitutional duty to give def opportunity to remove stuff before impoundment

Defendant’s van was legitimately impounded although he was not arrested. It was not constitutionally required to give him the opportunity to remove things from the van first. United States v. Gullo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140142 (E.D. La. October 2, 2014):

Gullo also asserts that the Court should not consider the search to be an inventory search because he could have safeguarded his own possessions since he was at the scene and no longer under arrest. (Rec. Doc. 31 at 3). In other words, Gullo contends that the inventory search was a pretext for an investigative search, as demonstrated by the fact that the deputies could have easily allowed Gullo to collect his personal belongings from the van. The Supreme Court addressed a similar, though not identical, issue when the Colorado v. Bertine defendant argued that the inventory search was unreasonable because the defendant could have secured his own property. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 373. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, averring that “the reasonableness of any particular government activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative ‘less intrusive’ means.” Id. at 374 (quoting Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983)). The Supreme Court went on to conclude that “reasonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure.” Id. Under this standard, it is of no consequence that the JPSO deputies did not afford Gullo the opportunity to safeguard his own valuables since the inventory search was carried out pursuant to JPSO policy.