Heck bar does not apply where plaintiff was not sentenced to imprisonment

Heck bar does not apply where the plaintiff was never able to file a habeas case because he was not sentenced to imprisonment. Pethtel v. Washington County Sheriff’s Office, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60105 (S.D. Ohio August 16, 2007):

Because, as discussed in greater detail below, Plaintiff’s § 1983 and Bivens claims accrued prior to the date he pleaded no contest to the reduced charge of disorderly conduct, the Heck bar does not apply. Moreover, because Plaintiff’s sentence consisted of a fine rather than imprisonment, a habeas remedy was never available to him. As the Sixth Circuit has noted, five justices of the Supreme Court are of the belief that the Heck bar, requiring a plaintiff to have his sentence or conviction invalidated before filing a § 1983 suit, does not apply when the plaintiff has not been sentenced to a term of imprisonment. See Fox v. VanOosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 352 n.8 (6th Cir. 1999). See also Johnson v. Freeburn, 144 F. Supp. 2d 817, 827 (E.D. Mich. 2001). For all of these reasons, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Heck.

Entry and search was by private individual without any assistance or knowledge of the government, so it did not violate Fourth Amendment, despite a motive to help the government. United States v. Sheridan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60115 (N.D. Iowa August 15, 2007):

In the present case, there is no evidence whatsoever that (1) the government knew of and acquiesced in Travis’s conduct in entering Sheridan’s room; (2) Travis intended to assist law enforcement agents; (3) Travis acted at the government’s request; or (4) there was any reward or other benefit Travis was seeking when he entered the room. The court finds Travis acted solely on his own behalf for the purpose of locating his favorite uncle to have a chat with him. Although Travis’s decision to report Sheridan’s activities “may have been motivated, to some extent, by an urge to help the government, either as a means of protecting [himself] … or by the ‘simple but often powerful convention of openness and honesty[,]’ … this is not enough to make [him] a government agent.” Huber, 404 F.3d at 1054 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2049, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971); Malbrough, 922 F.2d at 462).

Plaintiff’s false arrest claim, 20 years old, that he was falsely arrested for a crime that he did not commit, stated a claim. The State also waived its statute of limitations defense by not timely pleading it. Laughman v. Pennsylvania, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60079 (M.D. Pa. August 16, 2007)*:

The facts surrounding Laughman’s attributed confession are very much in dispute to this day. Laughman testified at his trial that he did not confess and he has proffered expert reports calling into doubt the legitimacy of the confession, in light of his innocence. Furthermore, while Defendants insist that Laughman’s innocence should not bear on the fact of his confession, the Court finds that a reasonable juror could find from the facts in dispute that Defendants knew that no confession occurred and thus arrested Laughman without probable cause. The ultimate question of probable cause cannot be answered until the underlying historical facts surrounding Laughman’s purported confession can be resolved. Thus, genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute and summary judgment must be denied on this ground.