Dog alert to cash was sufficient to show probable cause for cash seizure, at least in 7th Cir.

A drug dog’s alert to cash was held by the Northern District of Illinois to be a sufficient basis to seize it and start forfeiture proceedings, at least in the Seventh Circuit. The claimant was targetted after the DEA reviewed an Amtrak manifest, and when questioned on the train, he admitted having cash and said he was in construction and traveling to Austin, Texas, to buy property for construction purposes. This was on a motion to dismiss filed by the claimant. United States v. Funds in the Amount of Forty-Five Thousand Fifty Dollars, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58602 (N.D. Ill. August 9, 2007):

Contrary to Claimants’ assertion that “the probative value of a dog sniff is at most minimal,” (Motion to Dismiss P 5 (citing United States v. $506,231 in United States Currency, 125 F.3d 442, 453 (7th Cir. 1997))), dog sniff evidence is entitled to significant weight in the Seventh Circuit. In the case relied upon by Claimants, the Seventh Circuit overturned a grant of summary judgment to the United States in a case where the government sought forfeiture of $ 500,000 found hidden in a pizzeria. $506,231, 125 F.3d at 444. In its ruling, the court noted that none of the evidence offered by the government was sufficient to establish that the money was subject to seizure. Id. at 452-53. Specifically, the court stated that it was “unwilling to take seriously” the evidence of a drug dog’s positive reaction to the currency. Id. at 453. This conclusion was guided by the court’s understanding that “… no one can place much stock in the results of dog sniffs because at least one-third of the currency in the United States is contaminated with cocaine in any event.” Id.

If this ruling still represented the law in the Seventh Circuit, Claimants might be correct in their assertion that the government’s allegations of a positive dog sniff by themselves are not sufficient to state a “substantial connection” between the seized currency and narcotics under 18 U.S.C. § 983. The ruling in $506,231, however, was called into question, if not overturned, by the ruling in a more recent Seventh Circuit case. In Funds in the Amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Dollars, the Seventh Circuit upheld a district court’s grant of summary judgment to the government in a forfeiture action, where a positive dog sniff was the most important evidence offered to establish a “substantial connection” between the seized currency and illegal narcotics. 403 F.3d at 467. In its ruling, the court rejected its earlier position that dog sniff evidence was not entitled to probative weight, id. at 459, and engaged in a lengthy discussion of the scientific evidence supporting the validity of such evidence. Specifically, the court found persuasive the findings of several scientists who concluded that drug dogs react not to the smell of cocaine itself (which they acknowledged does contaminate much of the county’s currency), but to the smell of a chemical that is released by cocaine. Id. at 458-60. This chemical is only found on bills that have recently been in the proximity of cocaine. Id. As a result, the court concluded, “the totality of the circumstances, especially [the dog’s] alert to Calhoun’s cash, leads us to conclude that reasonable jurors would agree that it is more likely than not that Calhoun’s cash is subject to forfeiture.” Id. at 455.

In light of the holding in Funds in the Amount of Thirty Thousand Six Hundred Seventy Dollars, this court rejects Haltiwanger’s contention that [the dog’s] alert to the seized currency does not sufficiently allege a “substantial connection” between the currency and narcotics. While these allegations alone may not be enough to conclusively establish such a connection, when taken as true, they are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff’s allegation that an officer “detained and arrested him simply because he was attempting to call the police department and report the alleged intimidation and harassment by” that officer and two others stated a claim for relief under § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment. Alattiyat v. City of Memphis, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58488 (W.D. Tenn. August 9, 2007).*

Defendant officers stopped plaintiff on reasonable suspicion when they received a 911 call of an alleged drunk driver, and their observations gave probable cause, so the plaintiff’s case fails. Andreozzi v. Brooke County Comm’n & Brooke County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58497 (N.D. W.Va. August 8, 2007).*