Consent to “look around” after inquiry about guns in house was reasonably understood to be consent to look for guns

Court found consent voluntary, and permission to “look around” is consent. Since the request followed an inquiry about guns, the officer reasonably interpreted the response as consent to look for guns. United States v. Fuentes, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59164 (S.D. N.Y. August 10, 2007):

This Court is not the first to consider whether an affirmative response to a request to “look around” constitutes sufficient consent to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. At least four other [district] courts in this district have found that such an exchange provides an adequate basis for a consensual search. …

. . .

It is significant that Ricigliano’s request to search came immediately after his inquiries about the presence of guns and drugs in the apartment. A reasonable officer would expect that a request to “look around” immediately following his inquires about specific items would alert a suspect that the officer intended to “look around” for those very items, particularly in places where those items might be hidden. Here, it was reasonable to assume that Fuentes understood Ricigliano’s request to look around, which immediately followed his questions about guns and drugs, as a request to look around for guns and drugs. It was also reasonable for Ricigliano to construe Fuentes’s response as consent to engage in such a search.

Information that was two days old about a drug sale was not stale in a search warrant application when the police had information about drug transactions involving this premises going back four years. United States v. Phengsengkham, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59460 (N.D. Tex. August 8, 2007).* (Comment: This issue was not anywhere near a close call.)

Plaintiff stated a claim for relief in a civil case for taking his blood without probable cause and there were facts in dispute. Pankey v. City of Concord, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59123 (N.D. Cal. August 2, 2007).*

The juvenile court found defendant’s consent was voluntary. The fact he felt like he had no choice does not bear into the question because, if it did, no consent would be voluntary. I.R.C. v. State, 968 So. 2d 583 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 2007):

Other than the absence of notice of the right to refuse consent, all we have is I.R.C.’s testimony–which the trial court was entitled to discredit–concerning what he “felt.” If such testimony could–as I.R.C. contends–compel a determination that a consent to search was involuntary, it would be very rare indeed for a consent to be upheld. Such self-serving testimony by a defendant concerning his state of mind does not compel a determination of involuntariness. See State v. Kuntzwiler, 585 So. 2d 1096, 1096 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (upholding trial court’s determination that consent was voluntary notwithstanding defendant’s testimony that “she believed she had no choice but to allow the search”). In short, I.R.C. points to nothing that the trial court was required to credit as establishing that I.R.C. submitted to an implicit or explicit claim of authority.